CLOSE ENOUGH FOR GOVERNMENT WORK?USING INFORMAL PROCEDURES FOR
IMPOSING ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES
William Funk*
INTRODUCTION

No regulatory system can be effective without enforcement,
and monetary penalties are both historically accepted and generally believed to be an important enforcement tool. There are several models for monetary penalties. One is the model of criminal
fines.' As practically the only criminal penalty available to non-natural persons, and as an adjunct to other criminal sentences, criminal fines continue to play an important role in regulatory
enforcement. Both the nature of the offense and the resources
required to prosecute criminal cases, however, necessarily limit
their reach.
Another model is the judicially imposed civil penalty.' Under
this model, the burden of proof is on the agency to prove the violation, and the determination of the violation is a jury question.'
The court determines the amount of the penalty.4 Traditionally,
* Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. This Article is based upon a
report prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States. I would like
to thank Jeffrey Lubbers, Research Director for the Conference, and Nancy Miller,
staff attorney, for their support and watchful eye for developments that might affect
the Article. I would also like to thank the number of persons in the Environmental
Protection Agency who spent time with me discussing the issues involved in this Article, especially David Drelich of the Office of Enforcement, Water Division.
1 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1988) (providing criminal penalties of not less than
$2500 nor more than $25,000 per day for a first time negligent violation, rising to
$50,000 per day for subsequent negligent violations; not less than $5000 nor more
than $50,000 per day for a first time knowing violation, rising to $100,000 per day for
subsequent violations; not more than $250,000 for a violation which the person knows
places another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, rising to
$1 million if the person is an organization; and $10,000 for a first time false statement,
rising to $20,000 for subsequent violations).
2 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988) (up to $25,000 per day for each violation).
3 See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
4 See, e.g, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988) (listing factors court shall consider in "determining the amount of a civil penalty"). The law does not appear to be clear as to
whether the burden of proof or persuasion lies with the government to support a
particular money penalty or with the defendant to reduce the maximum statutory
amount below its maximum level. See, e.g., Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Tyson
Foods, 897 F.2d 1128, 1142 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that once a violation of the
Clean Water Act is made out, some fine is required and remanding to district court
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this judicial model was the primary means provided for assessing a
civil penalty. The amount of government resources necessary to
bring such a case, however, militates against using this tool except
in "big" cases.
A third model involves the administrative assessment of a monetary penalty, but this model has at least three subsets. At one pole
is the administrative penalty imposed through a formal adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).1 Here the administrative adjudication mirrors the trial in the judicially imposed
civil penalty. The agency has the burden of proving the violation.6
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) generally makes a recommended or initial decision as to the violation and the amount of
the penalty.7 After the opportunity for parties to file exceptions,
the agency makes the final decision based on the record. This decision may then be reviewed under the APA or a specific review
statute, which usually would require the reviewing court to uphold
the agency determination and penalty amount if supported by substantial evidence in the record.' If the penalty amount is not adequately justified, the court should not itself set the penalty amount
at the right level but should remand to the agency to set the
amount, because it is the agency that is to assess the penalty.
At the other pole is an agency assessment of a penalty after
informal or no procedures at all. Here the administrative assessment is more like an administrative complaint; it is what the agency
thinks to be the case, what the agency alleges to be true, and what
the agency thinks is appropriate as a penalty. The agency need not
involve the Department of Justice or the courts when making the
assessment or, most importantly, when compromising the penalty
amount. Traditionally, the understanding was that the agency
could not collect this assessment, absent agreement, without ajudicial proceeding in which the agency assessment would be subject to
de novo review.9 What both these poles have in common is that the
defendant has an opportunity for a full trial as to liability and penfirst to determine maximum statutory fine applicable to defendant and then to determine whether a lesser amount is appropriate in light of penalty factors).
5 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (1988).
6 See 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1988).
7 See, e.g., All Regions Chem. Labs, Inc. v. EPA, 932 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1991).
8 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E) (1988). Review of the penalty amount, as opposed
to the fact of violation, may also be reviewed on the basis of abuse of discretion, because of the notion that setting a penalty amount is an exercise of discretion. See, e.g.,
33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(8) (1988).
9 Colin Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties&yFederalAdministrative Agencies, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1435, 1439 (1979).
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alty amount before a strictly neutral judge, in one instance before a
court, in the other before an ALJ.
These two poles, however, do not exhaust the possibilities of
the administrative penalty assessment model. Between them is the
situation where the statute calls for or allows the use of informal
administrative procedures-that is, something less than a formal,
APA proceeding'°-but the judicial review is not de novo. Instead,
it is deferential review; either substantial evidence review" or arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion review.'" Here the defendant does not receive a full trial anywhere.
In 1986, for apparently the first time, Congress expressly provided for the last of these situations, authorizing the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to impose administrative penalties using procedures "not... subject to Section 554
or 556 of Title 5" but which "shall provide a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence."'" A person assessed a
penalty under these procedures could seek review before a district
court, which could set aside the penalty assessment only if there
was not substantial evidence on the record, taken as a whole, to
support the finding of violation, or if the amount of the penalty
assessed constituted an abuse of discretion. 4 Within a year, Congress passed three more laws with similar provisions. 15 Each of
these three created a two-tier penalty structure, specifically requiring a formal, APA adjudication for the larger (Class II) penalties,
while explicitly or implicitly providing for informal procedures to
10 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 13 19(g) (2)(A) (1988) (requiring an opportunity to request
a hearing at which one might be heard and present evidence, but not a formal, APA
hearing before assessing a penalty not to exceed $25,000 for violating requirements of
the Clean Water Act).
I See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 13 19(g) (8) (1988) (substantial evidence review of the violation and abuse of discretion review for the amount of the penalty).
12 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988). Absent a specific review statute, which, however, is increasingly evident, the fall-back position of APA review might have been de
novo review under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (F) (1988), but that provision has been largely
eliminated from administrative law after the Court's explanation in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
13 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-339, § 202, 100
Stat. 654 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(c)(1988)).
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(c)(6) (1988).
15 Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 314(a), 101 Stat. 46 (1987)
(codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (1988); Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 109(a), 100 Stat. 1633 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 9609 (a) (1988)); Emergency Preparedness and Community Right-to-Know Act, Pub.
L. No. 99-499, § 325(b), 100 Stat. 1753 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11045(b)
(1988)).
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govern lesser (Class I) penalties.' 6
While these were not the first and are not the only administrative penalties to be imposed after only informal procedures, 1 7 they
are different because Congress apparently made a conscious decision that the formal procedures of the APA should not apply, and
there is some indication that this decision in 1986 and 1987 was
not an isolated incident. In 1990, Congress expressly provided in
two more statutes for the two-tier penalty system where the larger
penalties require formal, APA adjudication but the lesser penalties
do not.'
If this constitutes a trend toward greater use of informal procedures for assessing administrative penalties, it would be in tension with the long-standing and consistent recommendations of
the Administrative Conference of the United States,' 9 as well as the
views and recommendations of administrative law scholars of all
stripes.2 0 The purpose of this Article is to explore this development and its implications. Part I briefly surveys the history of administrative penalties to provide the legal background against
which Congress's recent actions take place. Part II explores the
legislative history of the recent statutes to determine why Congress
wished to make the formal procedures of the APA inapplicable to
the particular penalties involved. Part III describes the informal
procedures EPA, the Corps of Engineers and the Coast Guard have
used to implement their penalty programs. Part IV then relates the
16 Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (2) (A) (1988) (requiring formal adjudication for
Class II penalties) with 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (2)(B) (1988) (explicitly mandating nonAPA proceedings for Class I penalties); 42 U.S.C. § 9609(a) (1988) (requiring formal
adjudication for Class II penalties) with 42 U.S.C. § 9609(b) (1988) (implicitly providing for non-APA proceedings for Class I penalties); 42 U.S.C. § 11045(b)(1) (1988)
(requiring formal adjudication for Class II penalties) with 42 U.S.C. § 11045(b)(2)
(1988) (implicitly providing for non-APA proceedings for Class I penalties).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Indep. Bulk Transport, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (Coast Guard assessment of penalties under Federal Water Pollution Control
Act).
18 Oil Pollution Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 4301 (b) (6), 104 Star.
51 (1990) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (b) (6) (Supp. III 1990); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 100-549, § 701, 104 Stat. 2672 (1990) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 7413(d) (Supp. III 1990)).
19 See Recommendation No. 79-3, Agency Assessment and Mitigation of Civil
Money Penalties, 1 C.F.R. § 305.79-3(c) (1991); Recommendation No. 72-6, Civil
Money Penalties as a Sanction, 1 C.F.R § 305.72-6 (1991).
20 See, e.g., Diver, supra note 9; Antonin Scalia & Frank Goodman, ProceduralAspects
Of The Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 U.C.LA. L. REv. 899 (1973); Goldschmid, An
Evaluation of the Presentand Potential Use of Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction By Federal
AdministrativeAgencies, in 2 Recommendations and Reports of the Administrative Conference of the United States 896 (1972) [hereinafter Goldschmid].
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experience that EPA has had using the informal penalty procedures. Finally, Part V addresses the issues raised by these laws, regulations, and practice, especially due process limitations.
This Article concludes that the perception that APA proceedings are more costly and time consuming than non-APA penalty
proceedings is not supported by adequate evidence. First, the APA
adjudication procedures themselves provide a number of means by
which to reduce the time and formality of the particular proceedings. Agencies could, by rule, require ALJs to use various time-saving procedures. Second, the evidence suggests that the length of
time involved in penalty proceedings is related more to the
amount of the penalty involved than to the type of procedure by
which it is assessed. Third, it is the rare penalty case that actually
goes to a hearing before an ALJ or hearing officer. Virtually all
cases are settled rather than tried.
Agencies have also argued that the cost and limited availability
of ALJs also justify exempting administrative penalty proceedings
from the APA. Given the few cases that actually need to be tried, it
is doubtful whether the cost and limited availability of ALJs would
have any significant impact. If, however, the only purpose of exempting the administrative penalty proceedings from the APA is to
avoid the requirement for ALJs, the exemption need not be total
and should include some requirement for assuring the neutrality
and fairness of the substitute hearing officer.
I.

THE HISTORY

Administratively imposed civil penalties are not new to admin-

istrative law. For example, as early as 1853, the Supreme Court
upheld a Customs-imposed 20-percent penalty duty for an undervaluation of imported goods. 2 ' The penalty did not rely on judicial
enforcement, because Customs merely withheld the imported
goods until the entire duty was paid. There was even a provision
for an "administrative appeal" of the alleged undervaluation in a
hearing before two "discreet and experienced merchants." Their
determination was to be "final and conclusive," which the Court
interpreted to mean not subject to review by courts except as to
their lawful authority. Despite this early endorsement of administratively imposed penalties, certain legal issues kept administrative
penalties relatively controversial.
One such issue involved the question whether or when "civil"
21 Bartlett v. Kane, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 263 (1853).
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penalties are really criminal penalties. The issue is an important
one, because if the penalty is "criminal," a host of additional procedural and other protections must be afforded defendants. Indeed,
defendants have often claimed that the designation of a penalty as
civil is just an attempt to avoid providing the protections otherwise
available to them. In probably the best known case on the subject,
Helvering v. Mitchel422 Justice Brandeis approached the issue by asking whether the sanction imposed was criminal or civil in its nature. To answer that question he considered four factors:
congressional intent, history of similar provisions, whether a government regulatory or revenue purpose was involved, and whether
the penalty was "free of the punitive criminal element." 21 In Helvering, Mitchell was accused of fraudulently withholding over
$700,000 in taxes, and the IRS assessed a 50 percent penalty of that
amount. The Court had little difficulty in determining that the 50
percent penalty was a "civil," not criminal, penalty. Congress had
clearly denominated it civil; there was a long history of civil penalties for underpayment of taxes; the penalty was directly involved in
the enforcement of the revenue laws; and there was no stigma or
moral reprobation in assessing the penalty.
Many have criticized the Helvering analysis as insufficiently determinative, 24 but its example of virtually complete deference to
the legislative classification of a penalty is consistent with the
Court's treatment of the civil/criminal issue both before and after
Helvering.25 Moreover, academic efforts to articulate a clear distinction between civil and criminal penalties have not been wholly successful.2 6 Nevertheless, the ability to define a penalty as "civil" is
critical to its administrative imposition, because it is widely ac303 U.S. 391 (1938).
Id. at 399-402.
24 See, e.g., Robert B. McKay, Sanctions In Motion: The AdministrativeProcess, 49 IowA
L. REv. 441 (1964). See also United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 554
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
25 See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); United States ex reL Marcus
v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909) (no 6th
Amendment right in judicial assessment of penalty duty); Ocean Steam Navigation
Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909); Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
531 (1871) (100% penalty duty for violating customs law a civil penalty). But see Lipke
v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922) (Court characterized as criminal a tax "penalty" of
100 percent the normal rate of tax for the sale of liquor in violation of National Prohibition Act). Cf.Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (deprivation of
citizenship penal in character requiring safeguards of Fifth and Sixth Amendments
applicable to criminal trials).
26 McKay, supra note 24; Walter Gellhorn, Administrative Prescriptionand Imposition
of Penalties, 1970 WASH. U. L.Q. 265 (1970); Goldschmid, supra note 20.
22

23
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cepted that administrative agencies cannot impose criminal
penalties.
A perhaps related question involves the Seventh Amendment's
right to a jury trial in cases at common law where the amount in
controversy exceeds twenty dollars.28 It was not until 1977 that the
Supreme Court decided that whatever the Seventh Amendment required with respect to cases in judicial fora, it did not bar the assignment to an administrative agency of the adjudication of "public
rights," including the imposition of money penalties.'
Thus,
agency determination of liability and assessment of money penalties is not subject to the Seventh Amendment, even though, were the
penalty imposed by a court, the Seventh Amendment would require a
jury trial as to liability for civil money penalties (but not of the
amount of the penalty to be imposed).3o

Another legal issue raised in objection to the administrative
imposition of civil penalties is the constitutionality of delegating to
administrative agencies the legal authority to impose monetary
3 1 Customs
penalties. In Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,
assessed a penalty against a steamship company for bringing diseased aliens to an American port under circumstances where the
disease could have been reasonably detected before sailing. The
company argued that even if Congress could impose civil penalties
for violation of a statutory duty, the collection of the penalty could
not be "committed to an administrative officer without the necessity of resorting to the judicial power.... [Otherwise,] the distinction between judicial and administrative functions cannot be
preserved .... " 2 The Court was not persuaded, finding numerous
and longstanding examples of administratively imposed sanctions
and concluding that where Congress had imposed a statutory penalty, enforcement and collection of that penalty was at least as
much an executive as judicial function. A quarter century later in
27

See Goldschmid, supra note 20, at 898; 1 KENNETH

DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw

TREATISE § 2.13, at 133 (1958); McKay, supra note 24, at 443-45;
ADMINIsTRATrVE LAW § 2.24, at 89 (3d ed. 1991). Characterization

Bernard Schwartz,
of a penalty as civil
is also necessary, although not sufficient, to overcome a charge of double jeopardy
when the person penalized is also subjected to criminal penalties. See United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
28 U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. VII. The Seventh Amendment provides, in pertinent part,
that "[i] n Suits at common law, where the value of the controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."
29 See Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n.,
430 U.S. 442 (1977).
S0 Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
31 214 U.S. 320 (1909).
32 Id. at 338.
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Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting,33 the Court reaffirmed its conclusion
despite a claim that because the penalty here was ten times that in
Oceanic Steam only judicial imposition of the penalty would
suffice.3 4

Finally, there remains the question as to the due process requirements applicable to administratively imposed penalties. Here
there are no Supreme Court precedents directly on point. Rather,
as is the case with other deprivations of property, the three-part test
of Mathews v. Eldridge"5 should apply.3 6
Given these various questions, despite the Court's general approval of administratively imposed penalties, it is perhaps not surprising that there existed a common prejudice against such
penalties. In 1952, for instance, Professor Bernard Schwartz wrote
in criticism of a New York law allowing the Superintendent of Insurance to impose money penalties administratively: "It is difficult
to imagine a statutory provision more repugnant to the basic principles upon which our administrative law is grounded. It violates
the fundamental rule that the imposition of a money penalty is,
with us, ajudicial, not an administrative function." 7 In 1965, Professor Jaffe suggested that "[c]onstitutional doubts and scruples
aside," "it is a close question whether there is sufficient advantage
in conferring the power to fine [on administrative agencies]."' He
concluded that "[i]f resort to the judiciary is tried and turns out to
be clumsy, inefficient, or ineffective, there is then a good case for
administrative penalty powers." 9 Even here, however, he counselled that rather than have the agency actually determine liability,
287 U.S. 329 (1932).
In the federal cases, the challenge was to the ability of an agency to determine
the liability for the penalty, where the amount of the penalty was set by statute. Some
state cases have distinguished between statutory schemes that set a fixed penalty and
those that authorize the agency to set the amount of the penalty, finding the latter
impermissible. See, e.g., Tite v. State Tax Comm'n., 57 P.2d 734, 741 (Utah 1936);
Broadhead v. Monaghan, 117 So. 2d 881 (Miss. 1960); State ex reL Lanier v. Vines, 164
S.E.2d 161 (N.C. 1968). Federal cases apparently have never recognized this
distinction.
35 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
36 Cf. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1483 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (informal, non-APA adjudicatory hearing for imposing "corrective action orders" satisfies Mathews v. Eldridge test).
37 Bernard Schwartz, 1952 Survey Of New York Law--AdministrativeLaw, 27 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 928 (1952). To Professor Schwartz's credit, he was able to reevaluate and later
repudiate this conclusion. See Bernard Schwartz, 1969 Survey of New York Law-AdministrativeLaw, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 389-90 (1970); Schwartz, supranote 27, § 2.28 at 9697 (1991).
38 Louis JAFFE, JuDIciAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 114 (1965).
39 Id.
33
34
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it should only make an "apparent liability" finding, which would
require a trial de novo40in court to enforce, thereby "avoiding all
constitutional doubts."

This advice accorded with the prevailing congressional practice. Thus, in 1972, when Professor Goldschmid made his report
to the Administrative Conference on civil money penalties, 4 1 he
concluded that of the 104 civil penalty provisions he identified,
only four involved "true administrative imposition" of penalties.42
The others required the agency to "be successful in a de novo adjudication in a district court (whether or not an administrative proceeding [had] previously occurred) before a civil money penalty
[could] be imposed."4" In order to provide agencies more enforcement flexibility, particularly by avoiding the necessity of obtaining
approval of the Department of Justice, and at the same time to
enhance fairness, Professor Goldschmid recommended increased
use of administratively imposed penalties that would not require de
novojudicial proceedings to enforce. Rather, persons who wished
to contest a penalty would have the opportunity for a hearing
under Sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA.4" Such adjudications, Professor Goldschmid wrote, should be "just, inexpensive,
and speedy." 4' The administrative decision would be final unless
appealed within a limited period to a federal court, where the review would be limited to substantial evidence review under the
APA.
The Administrative Conference, thereafter, formally adopted
a recommendation approving the increased use of civil money penalties as an alternative to criminal penalties and other draconian
Id.
See Goldschmid, supra note 20.
Id. at 908. The four were the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Postal Service, and the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board. Professor Goldschmid quotes from testimony by a congressman in opposition to a bill proposing to authorize the Federal Maritime Commission
to impose a penalty by administrative procedure alone:
[T]he legislation your Committee is now considering is not routine; is not
in any sense commonplace or comparable to existing agency powers
elsewhere; but would, to the contrary, represent a highly unusual, unprecedented and indeed revolutionary development in administrative
law.
Id. at 907 (quoting from F. Conger Fawcett, Statement on S. 2138 before the
Merchant Marine Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 10-11 (1971)).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 930.
45 Id.
40
41
42
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measures. 46 It also recommended the administrative imposition of
those penalties, at least where the penalty amount is small (less
than $5000) and is imposed pursuant to a system affording parties
an opportunity for a hearing on the record under Sections 554,
556, and 557 of the APA. 4?
By 1979, when the Administrative Conference next addressed
the issue, the number of civil penalty provisions had mushroomed.
Professor Diver's report to the Administrative Conference on administrative civil penalties identified 141 "agency-assessment" penalty provisions as well as 207 "court-assessment" provisions.4' Of
these 141 "agency-assessment" provisions, however, Professor Diver
believed that not all involved "true administrative imposition" of
penalties. Because a "full-scale trial-type hearing [must] be provided before a civil penalty can be exacted," 49 Professor Diver
stated, true administrative imposition of penalties could only occur
where those type of hearings were provided by the agency. Only 27
of the 141 "agency-assessment" provisions provided explicitly for a
formal hearing on the record under the Administrative Procedure
Act,50 however, while only 27 more required an otherwise unspecified notice and a hearing.5 ' From this, Professor Diver concluded,
most of the so-called administrative assessment provisions, those
which did not in fact provide "full-scale trial-type hearings," still
implicitly required a de novojudicial trial on the merits in order to
enforce the administrative penalty determination.5 2 His recommendation was that agencies provide the opportunity for a "fullscale trial-type hearing" even when the governing statute did not
53
require it, thereby forestalling the need for a de novojudicial trial.
46 See Recommendation 72-6, Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction, I C.F.R.
§ 305.72-6 (1991).
47 Id.
48 Diver, supra note 9, at 1441.
49 Id. at 1487.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1443 n.43.
52 See id. at 1485-89. See also Recommendation No. 79-3, Agency Assessment and
Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties, 1 C.F.R. § 305.79-3(d) (1991). Whether a "fullscale trial-type hearing" was necessary to determine the amount of penalty, as opposed to liability for having violated the law, Diver found unclear. See Diver, supra note
9, at 1487.
53 Diver, supra note 9, at 1490. In 1986, Senator Cohen published in the Congressional Record a table of statutes authorizing administrative penalties. See 132 CONG.
REc. S 13009 (daily ed. September 19, 1986). It indicated 141 separate statutory provisions authorizing administrative penalties. Of these, however, now 69 explicitly required an APA hearing. These involved nine different departments or their
subdivisions, as well as ten other independent agencies. Seventy-two provisions did
not explicitly require an APA hearing, but 67 of them required a "hearing" and judi-
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The Administrative Conference affirmed its 1972 recommendation, noting that the "constitutionality and desirability of administratively imposed penalties have been widely recognized." 54 It

also called upon Congress to provide expressly for formal adjudication under the APA when a person sought a hearing and for agencies voluntarily to provide such adjudications where the law was
silent or unclear on the issue.55 In this way, the need for a de novo
judicial trial could be avoided.56
Both Professors Goldschmid and Diver seem to have assumed
that if a defendant challenged the assessment of a penalty, either
the agency had to provide a "full-scale trial-type hearing," as provided by Sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA, or a court would
have to hold a trial de novo on liability. The Administrative Conference shared this assumption.57
This assumption appears to proceed from equating the procedures of Sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA with the requirements of due process. That is, if due process required a full-scale
hearing, then the procedures of the APA defined the nature of that
hearing. There was case law to support such a belief. Probably the
most important precedent was Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath.5
There Wong Yang Sung was ordered deported pursuant to a hearing before an "immigrant inspector," a person involved in the investigation and prosecution of deportable aliens, not before an
ALJ, 59 as would be required under the APA. The issue was whether
the APA applied to the deportation hearing, requiring independent examiners rather than immigrant inspectors. Section 554, by
cial review on the basis of substantial evidence, suggesting perhaps an intent to require formal adjudication. See, e.g., Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d
872 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978). It is worthy of note that all of these 67
provisions were enforced by the Coast Guard. Only four provisions did not by their
terms require a hearing at all and provided for de novo judicial review, while one
provision required a "hearing" and de novojudicial review. Under Professor Diver's
analysis, these latter five provisions should not be considered true administrative penalty provisions.
54 Recommendation No. 79-3, Agency Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money
Penalties, 1 C.F.R. § 305.79-3(c) (1991).
55 Id.

Id.
See id. § 305.79-3(d), 1 C.F.R. § 305.79-3(d) (1991) ("[some statutes] confer on
the agency only a power to 'assess' or to 'mitigate' penalties, thereby expressly or
implicitly reserving to the respondent the right to seek a subsequent de novo factfinding hearing by the court in a collection proceeding").
58 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
59 At the time, the APA provided for "examiners" rather than Administrative Law
Judges. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 404, ch. 324, § 7(a), 60 Stat. 237
(1946).
56
57
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its terms, applies "in every case of adjudication required by statute
to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing .... ."I No "statute" required a deportation hearing, but

the Supreme Court had long held that due process required a
hearing in deportation cases.61 Against this background, the Court
deemed the statute providing for deportation, which constitutionally could not be exercised without a due process hearing, to re62
quire a hearing, thereby triggering application of the APA.
This interpretation of the APA's language in its early years reflected the Court's view that the APA "represents a long period of
study and strife; it settles long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and enacts a formula upon which opposing social and political forces have come to rest."6" Accordingly, the Court believed it
appropriate to read the APA to apply broadly to the wide range of
situations that raised the issues that gave rise to the APA provisions.
Here, the use of an investigating officer as a hearing officer in deportation cases by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
seemed to raise the very problem of combining in one person the
prosecutor and the judge, at which some of the provisions of the
APA were addressed."
The logical implication of Wong Yang Sung, therefore, was that
if the Constitution requires a hearing on the record, the APA's provisions should provide the procedures for that hearing.6 5 Subsequent Supreme Court cases, however, substantially undercut such
an interpretation.
First, in Marcello v. Bonds,66 the Court found that, in light of
specific amendments to the immigration laws,67 the APA did not
apply to deportation proceedings, and due process did not prohibit the Immigration and Naturalization Service from using "special inquiry officers" in such proceedings, even though they were to
take the role of both prosecutor and judge. Marcello, therefore, ap60 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).

See, e.g., Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950).
63 Id. at 40.
64 Id. at 41-42.
65 See, e.g., Riss & Co., Inc. v. United States, 341 U.S. 907 (1951) (per curiam)
(denial of ICC certificate of public convenience and necessity requires due process
hearing, so APA procedures apply); Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S. 804 (1951) (per
curiam) (Solicitor General confessed error where Postal Service issued a mail fraud
order without giving an APA hearing).
66 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
67 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, ch. 477, § 242, 66
Stat. 280 (1952).
61

62
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proves an outcome directly opposite that in Wong Yang Sung. Nevertheless, there is nothing inconsistent in their treatments of the
APA or due process. Marcello does not question that deportation
proceedings still must provide hearings that satisfy due process requirements. Nor does it suggest any doubt that in the absence of
explicit congressional language the APA is presumed to provide
the procedures for those hearings. Because Wong Yang Sung was, at
bottom, an issue of statutory interpretation of the APA, there is
nothing inconsistent in giving effect to a later specific statute that
excepts a due process hearing from the APA procedures. The
question then becomes what procedure is required by due process.
In Marcello, the Court determined that due process did not strictly
require a judge who had no role in the prosecution, a determination that the Court has consistently followed.68
Second, in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co.,69 the
Court interpreted restrictively the APA phrase, "required by statute
to be determined on the record after an opportunity for an agency
hearing," so that a statute requiring a "hearing" prior to adoption
of a rule did not trigger the formal hearing requirements of the
APA. While F/oridaEast Coast Railway is easily distinguishable from
Wong Yang Sung because it dealt with rulemaking rather than adjudications, much less adjudications requiring provision of "due process" procedures, its thrust of restricting the application of the APA
provisions in light of practical concerns and in contrast with historical understandings7 ° is in tension with the tendency of Wong Yang
Sung to apply the APA provisions in circumstances of doubt. Some
courts, moreover, have looked to FloridaEast Coast Railway for guidance in determining when adjudicatory hearings required by statute trigger the APA's formal adjudication procedures, 7 1 and the
Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue of when an adjudicatory hearing required by statute triggers the APA.
Third and most importantly, in Mathews v. Eldridge,72 the Court
adopted a specific balancing test for determining what process is
due; it did not presume that the APA was the applicable procedure
68 See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).

410 U.S. 224 (1973).
Id. at 246 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Attorney General's Manual on the AdminisET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 238trative Procedure Act (quoted in WALTER GEuoa.o
39 (8th ed. 1987); Long Island R.R. Co.v. United States, 318 F. Supp. 490 (E.D.N.Y.
1970) (three judge court) (Friendly, J.), rev'd sub norm. United States v. Florida East
Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
71 See, e.g., United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
72 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
69
70
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once it decided that due process was required. Professor Diver argues that Mathews is not inconsistent with the notion that a fullscale trial-type hearing is required in penalty cases, and presumably that the APA specifies the procedures for this full-scale trialtype hearing. This is so, he says, because Mathews and most of the
cases applying it involve a question of the adequacy of pre-termination hearings when full-scale trial-type post-termination hearings
were available later.74 Thus, the issue was really one of timing
rather than the availability of a full-scale trial-type hearing. Nevertheless, as he concedes, the Court has approved less than formal
adjudication procedures even when there is neither a subsequent
full-scale trial-type administrative proceeding nor a trial de novo in
court.75 While each of these instances may be characterized as "pe-

culiar,"76 they are numerous and diverse enough to support the
conclusion that they are the result of a Mathews-type balancing approach, not that they are exceptions to a general rule.
Moreover, a flexible notion of the procedures dictated when
due process is required accords with both the judicial evolution of
due process law and scholarly commentary. As the Court expanded the universe of government actions that required due process, it inevitably created a strain on the historical notion of what
constituted due process. Perhaps nothing illustrates the development better than the devolution of "rudimentary due process" providing "minimum procedural safeguards"77 from the extensive

protections afforded in 1970 in Goldberg v. Kelly78 to the proce-

dures afforded a suspended public school student in 1975: oral notice, an explanation of evidence against him, and an opportunity to
present his side of the story. Judge Henry Friendly probably best
articulated the felt necessity to develop a balancing approach to
determine the appropriate
procedure in his celebrated article,
"79
Hearing.
of
Kind
"Some
73 See Diver, supra note 9, at 1487 n.277.
74 Id.
75 See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460

(1983) (prisoner placed in solitary confinement); Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982) (denials of Medicare Part B
claims); Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (academic dismissal of
medical student); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (corporal punishment of
school children); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) (prison disciplinary hearings); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (suspension of school children from
school); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (deprivation of prisoner's "good
time" credits).
76 Diver, supra note 9, at 1487 n.277.
77 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).
78 Id.
79 HenryJ. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing" 123 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1267 (1975).
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In any case, the inexorable development of a balancing approach to determine the procedure required by due process for
different kinds of proceedings has displaced the simple presumption of Wong Yang Sung that APA procedures define the due process procedures. Indeed, more recent commentators observe that
"[i] n federal due process cases .... the APA is rarely consulted as a
source of governing procedure." 0
Perhaps Professor Diver's and the Administrative Conference's assumption that administrative penalty proceedings would
be conducted pursuant to the APA stemmed from a belief that the
statutes authorizing the administrative penalties triggered, or at
least should trigger, the formal adjudication provisions of the APA.
For example, the original Federal Water Pollution Control Act of
1972 (FWPCA)1 authorized both the Coast Guard and EPA to as-

sess a civil penalty not to exceed $5000, the Coast Guard against
persons discharging oil or hazardous substances in navigable waters and EPA against other persons who violated regulations
adopted to prevent and clean up spills of oil or hazardous substances.82 The statute specified that no penalty was to be assessed
unless the person charged "shall have been given notice and opportunity for hearing on such charge."" The question naturally
arises, therefore, whether this language mandates use of Section
554, which applies "in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined
on the record after opportunity for an
4

agency hearing."

Neither the Coast Guard nor EPA believed the language required an APA hearing. Both provided only an informal procedure without an ALJ. 5 In its preamble, EPA made clear that it
viewed the informal procedure to be adequate "since full de novo
trials in the United States District Court are available to alleged
violators upon request."8 6 It is not clear whether the Coast Guard
took this position. The history is inconsistent. The legislative history of the FWPCA suggests that normal Coast Guard practice was
to use informal penalty procedures, but that collection proceed80 GELi-HoRN, ET AL., supra note 70, at 247.
81 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 862 (1972).
82 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1988) (Coast Guard); 33 U.S.C. § 13210)(2) (1988)
(EPA).
3
83 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1988) (Coast Guard); 33 U.S.C. § 1 210)(2) (1988)

(EPA).
84 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
85 See 43 Fed. Reg. 54186 (1978); 33 C.F.R. Subpart 1.07 (1978) (Coast Guard). 39
Fed. Reg. 31602 (1974); 40 C.F.R. Part 114 (1992).
86 39 Fed. Reg. 31602 (1974).
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ings in court would be a de novo hearing.8 7 In some cases brought
under the FWPCA, the Coast Guard either brought or acquiesced
in de novo collection proceedings. 8 In other cases, however, courts
reviewed the Coast Guard's penalty assessment on the record
under substantial evidence or "arbitrary and capricious" review, denying claims of a right to a de novo hearing or review.8 9 When the
issue was raised, the courts were also split as to whether the
FWPCA's language required an APA hearing or merely an informal
hearing.9" A constitutional due process challenge to the informal
hearing was rejected. 9 Despite this uncertain background, however, the Coast Guard continues to proceed informally for virtually
92
all of its many administrative penalties.
To conclude that Professor Diver and the Administrative Conference erred in assuming that true administrative penalties could
only be imposed using the formal procedures of Sections 554, 556,
and 557 of the APA is not to determine what the constitutionally
87 See H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 117-18 (1972). According to this
history:
[T] he respondent has the opportunity of a de novo hearing in any collection proceeding initiated by a United States Attorney after the conclusion of the administrative procedures. The net result is to parallel
the penalty assessment method which the Coast Guard has used in the
past in connection with laws which it administers.
Id.
88 See United States v. Malitovsky Cooperage Co., 472 F. Supp. 454 (W.D. Pa.
1979); United States v. General Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp 1151 (D.Conn. 1975). See
also United States v. Delian Cruises, 505 F. Supp. 79 (E.D. La. 1980) (holding over
Coast Guard objection that de novo review is available).
89 See United States v. Healy Tibbitts Constr. Co., 713 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1983);
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocatroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327 (D. P.R.
1978); In re Vest Transp. Co., 434 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Miss. 1977). See also United
States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 429 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd sub nom., United
States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 573 F.2d 1303 (3d Cir. 1978).
90 See United States v. Indep. Bulk Transp., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(APA does not apply); Healy Tibbitts Constr. Co., 713 F.2d at 1476 n.6 (APA would
apply-dictum).
91 See, e.g., United States v. Chotin Transp., Inc., 649 F. Supp. 356 (S.D. Ohio
1986).
92 See 33 C.F.R. Subpart 1.07 (1991). In April 1993, the Coast Guard adopted an
interim final rule to establish procedures for implementing the Class II administrative
penalty authority it shares with EPA under Section 109(b) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9609(b) (1988),
and Section 111(b) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (Supp. III 1990). See
58 Fed. Reg. 17926 (1993). These procedures provide for APA hearings in assessing
the Class II penalties. EPA continued to use its Part 114 procedures until 1992, when
as a result of amendments to 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) made by the Oil Pollution Control
Act of 1990, see supra note 18, it announced that it would use its 40 C.F.R. Part 22
procedures for the new Class II penalties and its proposed 40 C.F.R. Part 28 procedures for the new Class I penalties. See 57 Fed. Reg. 52,704 (1992).
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required procedures might be. For this, the Mathews v. Eldridge
calculus must be used. In Mathews, the Court identified three factors which should determine the procedures required. 3 The first
factor is the private interest affected by the government action; the
greater or more significant the interest, the more procedures the
private person should be able to invoke. The second factor is the
risk of erroneous decision under the procedures used and the likelihood that more procedures would reduce that risk. This factor
reflects the context in which most cases arise-as challenges by a
person asserting that the procedures used were inadequate. This
factor, therefore, attempts to measure the marginal utility of additional procedures. The third factor is the government's interest in
avoiding additional procedures. That interest is usually expressed
in terms of time, money, and efficient administration of the government program.
Applied to civil penalties, the private interest is primarily
money, or the amount of the penalty. This can vary to extreme
degrees. Thus, the maximum civil penalty for the failure to file
certain manifests with Customs is $20. 9 ' At the same time, the maximum civil penalty for certain banking violations is $1,000,000. 9
Moreover, the impact of a given penalty amount may differ significandy depending on the nature of the financial circumstances of
the defendant. Accordingly, for purposes of Mathews, the weight of
the first factor may vary greatly.9 6
With respect to the second Mathews factor, the risk of an erroneous determination and the likelihood additional procedures
would reduce that risk, the focus is on the contested facts. Absent
contested facts, the procedures applicable to trial-like proceedings
are generally inappropriate.9 7 In administrative penalty assessments, contested facts may be of two kinds: those related to liability
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
See 19 U.S.C. § 292 (1988) (assessed in judicial proceeding).
See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(b)(1) (1988) (assessed in judicial proceeding).
There is undoubtedly some stigma attached to assessment of a civil penalty of
any amount, but it is not considered of the same nature as that of a "criminal" sanction. Presumably, it would marginally increase the private interest in more
procedures.
97 See, e.g., R. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 245 (2d ed. 1992).
This black-letter rule arose in the environment of the then-extant understanding that
courts reviewed questions of law de novo. Accordingly, there was no need for an administrative hearing on questions of law. Subsequent to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), however, the Court has recognized that agencies may in
the course of an administrative proceeding interpret law which in effect binds courts.
If this is so, it is at least arguable that due process should require a hearing on such
legal questions as well. Obviously, the procedures incident to a right to a "hearing"
93
94
95
96
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(i.e., whether or not the defendant committed the acts charged)
and those related to the amount of the penalty (i.e., facts relevant
to setting the actual dollar amount of the penalty)."9 As Mathews
explained, however, the accurate determination of contested facts
is not always aided by trial-like procedures.' Scientific, financial,
and business information is often better proved through paper exchange than trial procedure with testimony and cross-examination.
Even where trial-like procedures may increase reliability of determinations, the degree of increase may not be significant. Given
the wide variety of administrative penalty provisions, the nature of
the facts likely to be contested is apt to differ from provision to
provision, if not from case to case. This suggests that little can be
said in general about the weight to be given to the second Mathews
factor in penalty cases.
The cost to the Government, the third Mathews factor, is generally a function of the number of the type of cases the government processes as well as the complexity of each. Thus, the
extensive procedural protections provided welfare recipients in
Goldberg were a burden to government because of the number of
cases involved.1 °° Consequently, "mass justice" cases have been
prime candidates for less than full trial-type procedures. Moreover, as cases increase in complexity, it may be that the costs of
trial-type procedures increase substantially. For example, if expert
witnesses are necessary, their costs can be phenomenal, or if program officers need to be involved in the particular cases, the ongoing functioning of the government programs may be substantially burdened. Penalty cases run the gamut. While few penalty
provisions are likely to involve the volume of Social Security or welfare cases, the trend in Federal enforcement is to authorize inspecon legal questions would be different from and undoubtedly less trial-like than a right
to a hearing on factual issues.
98 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9609(a)(3) (1988). Section 9609(a)(3) states:
In determining the amount of any penalty assessed [for violations of
requirements of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act], the President shall take into account the
nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of the violation or violations
and, with respect to the violator, ability to pay, any prior history of violations, the degree of culpability, economic benefit or savings (if any) resulting from the violation, and such other matters as justice may
require.
Id.
99 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-44 (1976).
100 See especially Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side Of Due Process: Some Theoretical
And Litigation Notes On The Assurance OfAccuracy, Fairnessand Timeliness in Adjudication
of Social Welfare Claims, 59 ComNELL L. REv. 772 (1974).
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tors to assess smaller penalties.10 1 Many cases involve little or no
factual dispute, such as when the defendant self-reports the violation. At the same time, some cases may involve highly complex
factual questions involving engineering or scientific data. Thus,
again it is not possible to generalize about the cost to the government of additional procedures in penalty cases, other than to say
that they would increase the cost to some degree.
The need for speed in adjudication is sometimes a relevant
government consideration, for example, where public health or
safety might be endangered. This consideration, however, would
not seem applicable to penalty determinations.
Many have criticized the Mathews factors because of their indeterminacy. 10 2 As one treatise says, "it is difficult to predict the precise result of application of the Mathews test to a class of disputes
until the Court decides a case within that class."103 Moreover, as
that treatise suggests, this indeterminacy leads courts generally to
defer to legislative or administrative determinations of adequate
procedural safeguards where the legislature or agency has acted in
good faith. 104 Consequently, in deciding what are the appropriate
procedures for assessing a particular set of administrative penalties,
agencies are probably best advised to be sensitive to the Mathews
factors in light of the size of the penalties involved and the nature
of the likely type of violations and penalty considerations involved.
Such advice would be consistent with the limited judicial treatment of informal procedures for assessing penalties prior to 1986.
Thus, in the cases brought under the oil spill provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,'0 5 the courts have considered
Congress's perceived determination that, in light of the relative
simplicity of the factual issues likely to be involved, the procedures
should be "expeditious and free from the procedural complexities
of the APA" 106 and that trial-type procedures are better "reserved
for the more factually complex and higher liability actions" 107 as
well as for those actions that have greater impacts on the public.108
101 Se, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (3) (Supp. III 1990) ("field citations" of up to $5000
may be assessed for violations of the Clean Air Act subject to an opportunity for a nonAPA hearing to contest the citation).
102 See, e.g PIERcE ET AL., supra note 97, at 249-51.
103 Id. at 250.
104 Id.
105 See supra note 82.
106 United States v. Indep. Bulk Transp., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 474, 481 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
107 Id.
108 See id. See aLso Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477 (D.C.
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II. THE STATUTES
Consistent with the Administrative Conference's recommen-

dations to Congress to make greater use of administrative penalties
as a means of enforcing regulatory provisions, 10 9 new regulatory
provisions increasingly included administrative penalty provisions.
Yet, early on, Congress expressed concern about the time and complexity associated with formal adjudication. For example, the legislative history of the penalty assessment provision in the original
Federal Water Pollution Control Act" 0 explained that: "The language 'notice and opportunity for a hearing' ... is not intended to

impose in every instance the complex procedural requirements associated with formal adjudicatory hearings on the record before a
hearing examiner. ... The committee believes that effective administrative enforcement will be enhanced by assessment procedures which are expeditious."'
Nevertheless, the statutory

language used was ambiguous, requiring "notice and an opportu-

nity for a hearing,"" 2 resulting in litigation over whether a formal,
APA adjudication was required" 3 and, if not, whether de novojudicial review was required. 4
A decade later, EPA was to have much the same problem with

respect to amendments to the Resource, Conservation, and Recovery Act 1 5 (RCRA). In the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984,116 Congress authorized EPA to order "corrective
Cir. 1989) (upholding EPA's informal adjudicatory procedures for "corrective action"
orders against a facial due process attack but noting that "the absence of formal safeguards could prove troublesome" in a particular case where there were both high
stakes and issues for which trial-type procedures would be important).
109 Recommendation 72-6, Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction, 1 C.F.R. § 305.72-6
(1991); Recommendation 79-3, Agency Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money
Penalties, 1 C.F.R. § 305.79-3 (1991).
110 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b)(6), 0)(2) (Supp. III 1990).
111 H.R. REP. No. 911, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. (86 Stat.) at 3668. The report went on to
explain that defendants' rights would be protected by the APA because they would
have "the opportunity for a de novo hearing in any collection proceeding initiated by
the United States Attorney after the conclusion of the administrative procedures." Id.
It is this latter statement that was ignored by the Coast Guard and EPA and by most of
the courts that addressed the procedures for assessing oil spill penalties. See patiularly Independent Bulk Transp. Inc., 480 F. Supp at 479 (court leaves out sentence on de
novo review, while quoting the three sentences before it and the sentence after it).
112 33 U.S.C. § 13210) (2) (Supp. III 1990). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (b) (6) (Supp.
III 1990).
113 See, e.g., United States v. Healy Tibbitts Constr. Co., 713 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir.
1983).
114 See, e.g., United States v. Delian Cruises, 505 F. Supp. 79 (E.D. La. 1980).
115 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988).
116 Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3256 (1984).
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action" whenever it determined that an "interim status facility" had
released, or was about to release, hazardous waste into the environment. 1 7 If a defendant requested a "public hearing," the corrective action order could only be final after the hearing." Again,
whether Congress intended this hearing requirement to invoke the
APA's formal adjudication requirements was unclear, but EPA took
the position that it did not. The D.C. Circuit upheld EPA's conclu1 9 to the agency's interpretasion, relying on Chevron's deference
1 20
language.
tion of the statutory
Given the costs of the statutory ambiguity in the applicable
procedures to be afforded, as well as the general judicial approval
of informal procedures for penalty assessments, it is not surprising
that EPA began to suggest specific language to Congress that would
authorize administrative penalties without the necessity of formal
adjudication. This was apparently first done in 1982 in the Administration's bill to reauthorize the Clean Water Act.1 2 1 EPA explained that its proposed amendment would authorize EPA to
assess civil penalties up to $10,000 a day and up to $75,000 maximum after an informal proceeding, which could be reviewed in
court in an appellate manner, not de novo.122 This, it was stated,
would be a new, needed enforcement tool, because under the
then-existing law, while EPA could issue administrative orders to
comply with the law, it could assess penalties only through judicial
civil actions.1 23 EPA explained in detail the extensive procedural
steps involved in judicial proceedings, suggesting that these cases
could take protracted periods of time. 1 4 EPA also indicated that
in order to go to court, EPA must refer the case to the Department
of Justice, which actually would bring the action.' 25 Although
nothing more was made of this referral requirement in the testimony and documents provided to Congress, many within EPA
viewed the burden of obtaining Department of Justice approval as
substantial and resulted in fewer penalty cases being brought, especially where the amount of the monetary penalty would not be sub42 U.S.C. § 6928(h)(1) (1988).
118 42 U.S.C. § 6928(b) (1988).
119 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
120 See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
121 See S.2652, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., § 8 (1982).
122 See Hearingsbefore the Subcommittee on EnvironmentalPollutionof the Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works, 97th ong., 2d Sess. 78 (1982) [hereinafter Senate
Hearings] (statement of Dr. John W. Hernandez, Jr., Deputy Administrator, EPA).
123 Id. at 78-79, 174.
124 Id. at 79-80.
125 See id. at 79.
117
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stantial. 1 26 In contrast, EPA noted, administrative proceedings
would be quicker and simpler. 127 While the proposed statutory
language explicitly ruled out any requirement for formal adjudication under the APA, the testimony did not distinguish between formal and informal procedures, except to note that the Coast Guard
was using informal hearings under Section 311 of the Act. 128 Instead, EPA referred generally to a hearing before "a neutral hearing officer," which would assure due process and provide a hearing
record for judicial review. 129
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) was the only
outside group to comment on the provision in the bill. While characterizing it as "non-controversial,"1 3 ° NRDC warned that the administrative penalty procedure should not interfere with citizens'
suits, be used to slap the wrist of major violators, or result in frittering away EPA resources "through endless administrative hearings
and appeals."'
EPA had already indicated that it would not use
this new administrative penalty procedure for major violations or
complex cases. Rather, EPA's intent was to use the procedure only
for "clear and well documented violations of the Act which may not
13 2
be serious enough to require judicial enforcement."
Congress's response was not immediately to adopt EPA's suggestion. Thus, a subsequent bill from the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works provided an informal proceeding
but required de novojudicial review of the determination. 1 33 In the
House, subsequent bills gave EPA the authority to assess civil penalties administratively, but only after a formal APA proceeding.13 4 By
1985, however, the Senate had come around to EPA's position,
providing explicitly for an informal hearing and judicial review of a
finding of violation on the basis of substantial evidence in the record and of the amount of the penalty on the basis of whether it was
an abuse of discretion. 3 5 The Senate Report went on at some
126 See id. at 174 ("the threat ofjudicial action is not a realistic deterrent since cases
with small proposed penalties must often wait to be filed, because these smaller cases
are assigned lower enforcement priority."). See also Goldschmid, supra note 20, at 900
("the Department of Justice presents an immovable roadblock; we cannot get our
cases into court").
127 See Senate Hearings, supra note 122, at 80.
128 See id. at 80-81.
129 See id. at 81, 174.
130
131
132
133

See id. at 237.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 81.
See S. REP. No. 233, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1983).

134 See H.R. REP. No. 827, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1984).
'35

See S. RE. No. 50, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 27-28 (1985).
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length to describe and justify these new provisions.1 6
First, the committee accepted the need for a penalty procedure that could be used more expeditiously and cheaply than judicially assessed penalties. Thus, the committee believed the
addition of this procedure would increase the total number of enforcement actions." 7 Second, the committee indicated its agreement that this new procedure should be used for "the less complex
cases," "where violations are straightforward, self-reported and
likely uncontested by the violator," because these violations are
"clearly documented and easily corrected."13 Third, given the nature of the expected violations, the committee believed that the
procedures for determining the violation and assessing the penalty
should be "as flexible and unencumbered by procedural complexities as possible, consistent with due process considerations." 3 9 Finally, the committee responded to NRDC's concerns by making
specific provision to deal with the interplay of citizen enforcement
suits and administrative assessment of penalties"4 and by providing
for public oversight of the penalty
assessments through public no41
tice-and-comment procedures.1

At approximately the same time, Congress was also considering a reauthorization bill for the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 42 and
amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act.'4 3 In the House, the
bills to reauthorize and make certain amendments to CERCLA
only permitted administrative penalties to be imposed pursuant to
formal adjudication under the APA. 4 4 EPA objected to this approach, stating that such procedures were "lengthy and laborious"
and would "require creation of a new layer of bureaucracy." 45
See id. at 26-29.
See id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
Id.
140 See id. at 28.
141 Id. at 27.
142 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988)).
143 Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 300f-i
(1988)).
144 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 253, Part 5, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 77 (1985) (requiring
the procedure used in the Toxic Substances Control Act, which requires the APA's
formal adjudication, see 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (1988)); H.R. REP. No. 253, Part 5, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20, 173 (1985).
145 Superfund Reauthorization:Judicialand Legal Issues, Oversight Hearingsbefore the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the HouseJudiciaryCommittee 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1985) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings] (statement of F.
Henry Habicht II, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division).
136
137
138
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Rather, EPA suggested the provision in the administration bill that
only required notice and a hearing before assessing an administrative penalty, 146 which had already been accepted by the relevant
Senate committee without comment. 1 4 7 The conference committee adopted both approaches, again without explanation, allowing
informal adjudication for penalties of not more than $25,000 per
violation, denominated Class I Administrative Penalties, but requiring formal adjudication for penalties over that amount but up to
$25,000 per day for each day of violation, denominated Class II
Administrative Penalties. 14 Inasmuch as EPA had consistently indicated its desire to use informal proceedings for "relatively small
penalty cases and minor violations," 149 this solution directly responded to its desires.
Much the same scene was being played out with respect to the
Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments. While the House was adding administrative penalty provisions requiring formal adjudication to EPA's enforcement arsenal under the Act, 150 the Senate was

providing informal procedures for administrative penalties virtually identical to those in its bill to amend the Clean Water Act.'
Indeed, the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee reported the Safe Drinking Water Act amendments and the Clean
Water Act amendments within a day of each other, and language
from one report explaining and justifying the informal penalty procedures was cribbed from the other. 15 2 The conference committee
on the Safe Drinking Water Amendments adopted the Senate provision with respect to the so-called Underground Injection Control
program, providing informal procedures for assessing administra146

Id.

147 See S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 81 (1985).
148 See H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23, 207 (1986). See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 9609 (1988). As part of the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act, Congress also enacted the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, Tide III, 100 Stat. 1729 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 11001-11050 (1988)). As enacted, EPCRA also contains a two-tier administrative
penalty scheme. See Section 325(b), 42 U.S.C. § 11045(b) (1988). It was added in the
Conference Committee, see H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 308-09 (1986), as
a combination of the House version, which required judicial proceedings to assess
civil penalties, see H.R. REP. No. 253, Part I, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 115-16 (1985), and
the Senate version, which, because there EPCRA was merely part of CERCIA, only
required informal procedures for administrative penalties, see S. REP. No. 11, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1985).
149 Oversight Hearings, supra note 145, at 65.
150 See H.R. REP. No. 168, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 8, 27, 31 (1985).
151 See S. REP'. No. 56, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1985).
152 Compare S. REP. No. 50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1985) with S. REP. No. 56,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1985).
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tive penalties up to $125,000.153
The bills to amend the Clean Water Act, although having
started earlier, were delayed and were the last to be considered.
The conference committee followed the lead of the conference
committee on the CERCLA amendments, creating a two-tier administrative penalty system, with Class I penalties up to $25,000 imposed without formal adjudication and Class II penalties up to
In addition,
$125,000 imposed only after formal adjudication.'
the Secreto
was
given
authority
penalty
administrative
the same
tary of the Army to enforce Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. 155
These provisions became part of the Water Quality Act of 1987.156
Subsequent environmental statutes reflect this trend. Thus,
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 revised the administrative penalty
provisions relating to discharges of oil or hazardous substances into
the navigable waters. 15 7 In place of the previous, uniform but ambiguous requirement for "notice and opportunity for a hearing"
before assessing a penalty not to exceed $5,000, with judicial actions for any larger amount, Congress generally copied the two-tier
administrative penalty procedure applicable to the enforcement
provisions of the rest of the Clean Water Act.' 5 1 Similarly, the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 added a two-tier administrative
penalty authority to EPA's enforcement arsenal: a formal APA penalty procedure with penalties up to $25,000 per day, not to exceed
"field citation" program,
$200,000 per violation, and an informal,
15 9
day.
per
$5,000
to
up
penalties
with
This legislative history reveals a number of purposes behind
these administrative penalty procedures. The Administrative Conference had recommended increased authorization of administrative penalties, in contrast to the existing judicially imposed
penalties. Its purpose had been two-fold, to expedite and facilitate
enforcement, but at the same time to increase fairness to defendants. The two went hand-in-hand, because the cost and time
involved in judicial proceedings first provided significant disincen153 See H.R.
2(c) (1988).
154 See H.R.

REP.

No. 575, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1986). See also 42 U.S.C. § 300h-

REP.

No. 1004, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 138-39 (1986). See aLso 33 U.S.C.

§ 1319(g) (1988).
Id.
See Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 314, 101 Sta. 46 (1987).
157 See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (Supp. III 1990).
158 Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (Supp. III 1990) with 33 U.S.C. § 1309(g)
(1988). See also H. REP. No. 653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 153 (1990).
159 See Pub. L. No. 549, § 701, 104 Stat. 2672 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(d) (Supp. III 1990)).
155
156
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tives to agencies' use of these penalty provisions and second created substantial disincentives to defendants to contest a case. As a
result, defendants would almost always settle the case, even if they
believed they had a legitimate defense. The Conference expected
that the use of administrative penalties would enable agencies to
use penalties more effectively in their enforcement programs,
while at the same time affording defendants a more cost-effective
forum in which to contest a case. The Conference's recommendation presumed that the administrative penalty procedure would be
formal adjudication under the APA. Nevertheless, these formal
proceedings were seen as much less cumbersome, time-consuming
and expensive than judicial proceedings. The fact that agencies
would no longer need to obtain Justice Department approval was
no small part of this increased efficiency.
EPA, however, argued to Congress that formal adjudication
procedures were themselves too "lengthy and laborious." 16° EPA
cited no figures or particular experience to justify this conclusion,
but members of Congress have heard many complaints about long,
involved formal administrative proceedings, and it is true that the
procedures for formal adjudication do not emphasize, much less
guarantee, expeditious case-handling. Consequently, it is not surprising that EPA's argument found sympathetic ears in Congress.
In addition, EPA argued that formal, APA adjudication would "require creation of a new layer of bureaucracy. " 16 1 What EPA meant
by this is not entirely clear, but it apparently referred to the need
for ALJs in formal adjudications. How a handful of ALJs could be
considered "a new layer of bureaucracy" is not self-evident, but this
reference seems to reflect a deep-seated, negative perception of
ALJs as a group, shared by a number of EPA personnel involved in
the enforcement program. ALJs were perceived as having no interest in expediting cases, minimizing costs, or facilitating resolution.
Moreover, these personnel believe the independence afforded
ALJs makes it virtually impossible for the agency to alter whatever
culture exists among ALJs to afford maximum procedural rights,
rather than balance the cost and time of particular procedures
62
against the need.1
160

See Oversight Hearings,supra note 145.

161 Id.
162 In the course of separate interviews with EPA enforcement officials involved in
the administrative penalty program, I was told of "horror stories" involving ALJs.
When I asked for specifics, however, the speakers admitted they were referring to
what others had said. Whatever the facts, there is clearly a perception by EPA officials
involved in enforcement that ALJs are responsible for "long and frustratingly ineffi-
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Nevertheless, Congress did not generally provide for exclusively informal procedures. Instead, the informal proceedings are
part of a two-tiered system of administrative penalties, plus provision for judicial imposition of civil penalties. 163 Generally, these
are rationally tiered, so that the lowest penalty amount can be assessed informally, a higher amount in a formal adjudication, and a
still higher amount in a judicial proceeding. 164 This tiering was
responsive to EPA's representation that the informal penalty procedures were to be used for the less complex cases, where the factual
issues and compliance questions would be straight-forward, and
where the nature of the violation was less serious. Absent such facilitation, EPA had suggested, these cases simply would not be
brought because they would be too time and resource intensive to
justify, given their relatively minor nature. EPA represented that
the more serious cases would still be brought judicially, or at least
through more formal adjudication.
III.
A.

THE IMPLEMENTATION

The Regulations

The 1986/87 legislation empowered two agencies to assess administrative penalties without using APA procedures: EPA and the
Army Corps of Engineers. The 1990 legislation added the Coast
Guard. EPA, within months of the passage of the Water Quality
Act of 1987, published guidance in the Federal Register, which
amounted to rules of procedure governing the Class I informal
penalty assessments.1 65 That guidance announced "the expectation that EPA will later notice [the procedures] for proposed
rulemaking." 16 It was not until 1991, however, that EPA in fact
proposed rules to implement all of its various informal penalty procient proceedings." It is, therefore, not surprising that EPA has in recent years sought
to have all new administrative penalties imposed through non-APA procedures, see
text supra at notes 122, 145, 151, and even to remove some remedial order proceedings from APA procedures, see Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d
1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (regulations requiring only informal hearings for imposing
"corrective action orders" under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
163 The exception is the provision in the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h2(c) (1988).
164 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) & (g) (1988); 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (6) & (7) (Supp. III
1990); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) & (d) (Supp. III 1990); 42 U.S.C. § 9609(a)-(c) (1988)
(judicial assessment at same level as formal adjudication); 42 U.S.C. § 11045(b)
(1988) (judicial assessment at same level as formal adjudication).
165 See 52 Fed. Reg. 30,730 (1987).
166

Id.
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grams other than the Clean Air Act field citation program. 167
These proposed rules were to be field-tested for a year before EPA
would adopt final rules.' 6 8
The Corps, while it initially took longer to act, then proceeded
with dispatch. The Corps issued a proposed rule in 1989,169 and
later the same year it issued a final rule. 170 The rule adopted procedures governing the Corps assessment of administrative penalties
for violations of permits issued under Section 404 of the Clean
17 1
Water Act.
The Coast Guard, as discussed earlier, had used informal penalty procedures under the original FWPCA with its ambiguous administrative penalty procedures. In 1978, the Coast Guard adopted
rules to govern all its penalty assessments, not just those under the
FWPCA.'7 2 These rules established an informal proceeding for assessing all penalties. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, however,
amended the FWPCA framework, creating the two-tier system of
Class I and Class II administrative penalties.' 73 The Class I penalties were potentially larger than the old FWPCA penalties and were
explicitly to be assessed in an informal proceeding. The Class II
penalties were potentially larger yet, but they required formal adjudication under the APA. The Coast Guard took no action to
change its penalty procedures to include Class II penalties until
March 1993, when it adopted an interim final rule establishing forSee 56 Fed. Reg. 29,995 (1991).
Interview with Elyse DiBiagio-Wood, Office of Enforcement, Water Division,
United States Environmental Protection Agency, in Washington, D.C. (October 10,
1991).
169 See 54 Fed. Reg. 20,608 (1989).
170 See 54 Fed. Reg. 50,708 (1989) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 326.6 (1991)). The
Corps did not achieve the same dispatch with respect to Class II penalty procedures
which it had demonstrated with respect to the Class I penalty procedures. The Corps'
last several Regulatory Agendas have included schedules for developing those procedures, but those schedules have yet to be met. See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 53,207 (1991). As
of February 1992, the Corps had yet to propose procedures for Class II penalties.
171 Apparently, however, this rule has never been used. Interview with Lance Wood,
Office of Chief Counsel, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in Washington, D.C. (March
13, 1992). It is not clear why the Corps has not used this authority, although it may
relate to the fact that the Corps has no history of administrative adjudication, lacking
any ALJs, and therefore is institutionally ignorant of administrative adjudication.
172 See 43 Fed. Reg. 54,186 (1978), adopting 33 C.F.R. Subpart 1.07.
173 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (6) (B) (Supp. III 1990). Also, pursuant to the SARA
amendments to CERCLA, see note 15 supra, the President delegated his authority to
assess both Class I and Class II administrative penalties under 42 U.S.C. § 9609(b), not
only to EPA, but also to the Coast Guard when the violation occurs in waters of the
United States. See Section 4(c)(2), Exec. Order No. 12580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987),
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 9609 note (1988).
167
168
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mal, APA procedures for these Class II penalty proceedings. 1 4
EPA's proposed rule would create a new Part 28 in title 40 of
the Code of Federal Regulations. This Part 28 would contain the
consolidated rules of practice for informal penalties imposed
under the Clean Water Act, CERCLA, EPCRA, and the Safe Drinking Water Act. At 13 pages of Federal Register, however, this Part
would be longer than EPA's consolidated rules of practice for formal penalties in Part 22. It is also over four times the length of the
penalty procedures used by the Coast Guard or the Corps of Engineers for their informal penalty proceedings.1 75 The preamble to
the rule extends to 25 Federal Register pages. What is it that
makes these "informal" proceedings so complicated?
Under both the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act
administrative penalty provisions, EPA is required to give "public
notice" before assessing a penalty, so that "interested persons" may
comment on the proposed penalty and, if the defendant requests a
hearing, participate in the hearing.176 Under the Clean Water Act
provision, even if the defendant does not request a hearing, any
interested person who comments on the proposed penalty may petition EPA within 30 days of the issuance of the order to set aside
the order and to provide a hearing.177 EPA is required to set aside
the order and hold a hearing if evidence contained in the petition
is material and was not considered in issuing the order.178 In addition, under the Clean Water Act, EPA must consult with the state in
which the violation occurs in assessing the administrative
penalty.

1 79

These public procedures are unusual for an adjudication.
EPA's proposed rule provides that public notice should be given by
See 58 Fed. Reg. 17,926 (1993).
See 33 C.F.1. Subpart 1.07 (1991); 33 C.F.R. § 326 (1991).
176 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (4) (A), (B) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(c) (3) (B), (C)
(1988). Under the Clean Water Act, if the Corps of Engineers is assessing an administrative penalty for a violation of a Section 404 permit, these same public procedures
would apply to the Corps' proceeding. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (4) (1988). Similar
public participation rights exist with respect to Class II penalties only under the Oil
Pollution Act provisions. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (6) (C) (Supp. 1II 1990).
177 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (4) (C) (1988). Again, this is also true of Corps' proceedings under the same section for violations of § 404 permits. Again, also, there is a
similar provision with respect to Class II penalties only under the Oil Pollution Act.
33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(C) (Supp. III 1990).
9
178 33 U.S.C. § 131 (g) (4) (C) (1988). Again, this is also true of Corps' proceedings
under the same section for violations of § 404 permits. Again, also, there is a similar
provision with respect to Class II penalties only under the Oil Pollution Act. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321(b) (6) (C) (Supp. III 1990).
179 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(1) (1988).
174
175
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mail to "any person who requests such notice.""8 0 In addition, notice should be given to "potentially affected persons" in an unspecified manner. 8 1 The preamble states that EPA intends "ordinarily"
in these circumstances to publish notice in a local newspaper or
other media. 182 The public notice is a document that identifies the
respondent, the EPA office involved, any permit involved, the alleged violations, the Hearing Clerk whom interested persons may
contact for further information, and EPA's authority to issue a default order if respondent does not respond in a timely manner. 183
In addition, the notice includes the information that a member of
the public may submit written comments on the complaint to the
Hearing Clerk and become a participant in the proceeding.18 Any
1 85
comments must be filed within 30 days of receipt of the notice.
They then become part of the administrative record, subject to certain limitations.' 86
Participation by commenters in the proceeding itself is strictly
limited. Classifying commenters as "participants," 187 but not "parties,"' EPA does not allow commenters to take part in the prehearing conference, engage in any discovery, or have any participation in default or consent orders or summary or accelerated decisions.189 Commenters are allowed to call witnesses and introduce

evidence after the conclusion of both EPA's and the respondent's
case, 190 but commenters are not allowed to cross-examine either
the agency's or the respondent's witnesses. 191 The parties, however, may cross-examine the commenters' witnesses. 192 Com180 56 Fed. Reg. 30,027 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.16(d)) (proposed
July 1, 1991).

181

Id.

See 56 Fed. Reg.30,010 (1991).
See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,023 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.2(q)) (proposed
July 1, 1991).
182

183

184

Id.

185 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,027 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.20(c)) (proposedJuly 1, 1991).
186 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,021 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.2(b)(9)) (proposed July 1, 1991).
187 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,022 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.RL § 28.2(1)) (proposed
July 1, 1991).
188 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,022 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.2(m)) (July 1,
1991).
189 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,028-30 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R §§ 28.21 - 28.25)
(July 1, 1991).
190 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,031 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.26(g) (5)) (proposed July 1, 1991).
191 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,031 (1991) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. § 28.26(f)) (proposed
July 1, 1991).
192 Id.
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menters may participate in closing arguments and submit
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the Presiding
Officer.193

In the event that a hearing is not held, EPA's proposed rule
reiterates that a commenter may petition the Regional Administrator to set aside the order and to hold a hearing, if the commenter
has material information not already considered.194 If the petition
is granted, there is a hearing; if the petition is denied, the participants are notified, and the denial is noticed in the Federal
Register.' 95
Despite the rather elaborate public procedures, interested
persons rarely, if ever, either comment on a proposed order or participate in a hearing."' This may be because there are not very
many persons who would be interested in penalty orders, other
than perhaps some environmental groups. Environmental groups
were, after all, the ones who raised the specter that EPA might use
these administrative penalties only to slap offenders on the wrist,
and the public procedure requirements were placed in the law presumably so that environmental groups could monitor EPA's activity. This does not appear to be happening.
There are a number of possible explanations. One is that environmental groups may not be getting effective notice. The proposed rule states that public notice will be provided to "any person
who requests such notice."' 97 Because penalty actions are initiated
at the regional level, this means that persons must request such
notice from regional offices. It is doubtful, however, whether regional environmental groups are even aware of this opportunity or
requirement for notice. EPA's preamble suggests that the agency
will maintain "an appropriate mailing list."' 98 An FOI request to
each of the EPA regions, however, resulted in many offices indicat193 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,031 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.26(i) & (k))
(proposed July 1, 1991).
194 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,033 (1991)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.30(a)) (proposedJuly 1, 1991).
195 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,033 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.30(b) & (c))
(proposedJuly 1, 1991).
196 In talking to a number of EPA personnel involved in Class I penalty proceedings, I have found only one person who knows of instances when there have been
comments filed by interested persons. Apparently, sometimes mining or "right wing
public interest groups" comment in Alaska. The Federal Register fails to show any
case where a hearing has been required because a commenter has petitioned for one.
197 56 Fed. Reg. 30,027 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.16(d)) (proposed
July 1, 1991).
198 56 Fed. Reg. 30,010 (1991).
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ing no list, because no one has requested to be given notice.'99
Some offices provided a general notification list, but an addressee
on one of the lists does not recall ever receiving public notice of an
administrative penalty action. 2 ° The preamble also states that notice to potentially affected members of the public is also to be
given, "ordinarily" by publishing notices in local newspapers.2 ° ' Assuming such notice is given, it still would not be surprising if environmental groups or others with an interest in penalty actions do
not discover it.
Another explanation is that environmental groups simply may
not have the time or resources to research the issues in the penalty
orders about which they receive notice. Most environmental
groups, even well-funded ones, are stretched in terms of the issues
and projects they can cover. The administrative penalties assessed
under the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act, and especially the Class I penalties under the Clean Water Act, are relatively
small in amount and the cases relatively straightforward. Consequently, environmental groups may not see commenting on or participating in administrative penalties as an efficient use of their
2
resources.

20

A third explanation may be that EPA's actions under the administrative penalty program are satisfactory to environmental
groups, so they see no need to comment or participate in the hearings. Perhaps the most likely explanation is a combination of all
three. Only a subset of potentially interested persons are probably
receiving effective notice, and the environmental groups who do
receive notice probably do not see that the marginal benefit from
their commenting or participation in the proceeding is worth the
cost to their organizations.
Consultation with the state is achieved by notice of the action
to the agency with the most direct authority related to the matters
in the action. 203 EPA must give this notice within 30 days of the
respondent's receipt of the complaint. 20 4 No further specification
199 See, e.g., letter from Veronica Harrington, Chief, NPDES Program Operations

Section, Region I, EPA, Boston, Massachusetts to the author (Feb. 11, 1992) (on file
with the author).
200 Letter from Kirk Cunningham, Water Quality Chair, Sierra Club, Boulder, Colorado, to the author (Feb. 3, 1992) (on file with author).
201 56 Fed. Reg. 30,010 (1991).
202 See Letter from Kirk Cunningham, Water Quality Chair, Sierra Club, Boulder,
Colorado to the author (Feb. 3, 1992) (on file with author).
203 56 Fed. Reg. 30,027 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R § 28.19) (proposed July
1, 1991).
204 Id.
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is given as to the nature or method of the state consultation. 20 5
The preamble states that the nature or substance of
the consulta20 6
tion need not be part of the administrative record.
There is little evidence that this consultation with the state is
meaningful. Generally, EPA's enforcement is coordinated so as
not to interfere with state enforcement, so there develops a division of labor. EPA generally monitors the states' enforcement activities and the states generally monitor EPA's, but normally there
is little overlap. Consequently, it seems unlikely that states are using their limited resources to become actively involved in administrative penalty cases, which are of the smallest consequence and
are the least problematic of enforcement cases.
The public procedures, however, are not the source of the
complexity of EPA's proposed rules. After all, the Corps of Engineers is under identical statutory requirements for its enforcement
of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, and the Coast Guard is
under identical requirements with respect to its Class II administrative penalties. 7 Rather, the complexity arises out of two potentially conflicting purposes of EPA's rules. One purpose is to assure
sufficient procedures to satisfy due process; the other is to assure
the most timely conclusion of informal penalty cases and to constrain substantially the discretion of the hearing officer both with
respect to the procedure and the substance of the penalty proceeding, presumably also to assure expedition. The procedures of the
Corps and the Coast Guard share the former purpose, but not the
latter.
Both the Corps and EPA procedures establish a Presiding Officer,20 8 while the Coast Guard provides for a Hearing Officer." 9
Under EPA's procedures the Regional Administrator appoints a
Presiding Officer for a case within 20 days of service of the com21 1
plaint.2 10 The Presiding Officer is to be "an Agency attorney"
205 The Corps of Engineers' rule specifies that the appropriate state agency shall
have the same opportunity to comment and participate in the hearing as a public
commenter. See 33 C.F.R § 326.6(d)(3) (1991).
206 56 Fed. Reg. 30,011 (1991). The actual regulatory language, however, is ambiguous on this issue. See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,021 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 28.1(b)(4)) (proposedJuly 1, 1991).
207 See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(C) (Supp. III 1990).
208 56 Fed. Reg. 30,023 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.2(n), 28.4) (proposedJuly 1, 1991); 33 C.F.RI §§ 326.6(a)(3)(v), 326.6(h)(3) (1991).
209 See 33 C.F.R. §§ 1.07-5(b), 1.07-15 (1991).
210 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,027 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.1. § 28.16(h)) (proposedJuly 1, 1991)
211 56 Fed. Reg. 30,022 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.2(n)) (proposed
July 1, 1991).
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who has no interest in the outcome of the case or any prior connection with the case before her, whether investigative,
prosecutorial, or supervisory.212 Under the Corps procedures, the
District Engineer appoints as Presiding Officer a member of
"Corps counsel staff or other qualified person," who likewise is to
have had no prior connection with the case2 1 3 and is to have no
investigative, prosecutorial, or supervisory responsibility with respect to the case before her. 214 Both sets of procedures prohibit ex
parte communications with the Presiding Officer 215 and provide for
removal of the Presiding Officer for making prohibited ex parte
communications. 216 Both allow for sanctions against a participant
for making ex parte communications.217 Unlike EPA and the Corps
Presiding Officer, the Coast Guard's Hearing Officer need not be
an attorney. 218 The neutrality requirements are stricter, however,
prohibiting the Hearing Officer not only from having any prior
connection or responsibility with respect to the particular case, but
also from having any "other responsibility, direct or supervisory, for
the investigation of cases referred for the assessment of civil penalties."2 19 In other words, unlike the EPA and Corps Presiding Officer, the Coast Guard Hearing Officer cannot otherwise be
involved in enforcement activities. There are, however, no prohibitions on ex parte communications with respect to the Hearing
Officer.
The general role of the Presiding Officer and Hearing Officer
is similar under the three sets of procedures. The Presiding Officer or Hearing Officer is responsible for conducting any hearing.2 20 The Presiding Officers make a recommended decision, 2

while the Hearing Officer makes a decision that may be ap212 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,024 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.4(c) (1), (2))
(proposed July 1, 1991).
213 33 C.F.R. § 326.6(h)(4) (1991).
214 33 C.F.R. § 326.6(h)(3) (1991).
8
215 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,023 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 2 .2(p)) (proposed
July 1, 1991); 33 C.F.R. § 326.6(a)(3)(vi) (1991).
216 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,025 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.13(a)) (proposed July 1, 1991); 33 C.F.R. § 326.6(h) (5) (iii) (1991).
217 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,025 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R § 28.12) (proposed
July 1, 1991); 33 C.F.R. § 326.6(h)(5)(iv) (1991).
218 See 33 C.F.R. § 1.07-5(b) (1991).
219 33 C.F.R. § 1.07-15(a) (1991).
220 56 Fed. Reg. 30,023 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.4(a) (2)) (proposed
July 1, 1991); 33 C.F.R. § 1.07-55 (1991); 33 C.F.R. § 326.6(i) (1991).
221 56 Fed. Reg. 30,023 (1991) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. § 28.4(a)(1)(xii)) (proposedJuly 1, 1991); 33 C.F.1. § 326.60) (1991).
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pealed.222 The Coast Guard and the Corps' regulations, however,
address the hearing procedures rather generally, providing a fair
degree of discretion to the Presiding Officer in terms of controlling the hearing. 223 EPA's proposed regulations read like a detailed cookbook.
First, there are specified procedures separately governing consent orders, summary determinations, and accelerated recommended decisions.224 There are no comparable Coast Guard or
Corps provisions. The proposed EPA regulations authorize consent orders between the parties at any time, which immediately
have binding legal force without further action by the Presiding
Officer or the Regional Administrator. 225 If, however, the case
arises under the Clean Water Act or Safe Drinking Water Act and
members of the public have commented, the parties must propose
the consent order to the Regional Administrator, who must approve or disapprove it.2 26 Elaborate procedures are provided for

summary determinations as to liability, which may be made by the
Presiding Officer sua sponte or at the request of any party.227 If the
Presiding Officer determines there is no genuine issue of material
fact with respect to liability, she may "accelerate" a recommended
decision, unless "there is compelling need
for further fact-finding"
228
with respect to the amount of penalty.

Second, EPA procedures go into substantial detail as to default
proceedings, 29 while the Coast Guard and Corps provisions merely
state that failure to request a hearing within 30 days waives the
right to a hearing.2 0 The EPA provisions distinguish here, as they
do elsewhere, between determinations of liability and determinations of remedy (penalty amount) .231 Failure to respond within the
required 30 days results in a default as to liability, so long as the
222 33 C.F.R. § 1.07-65 (1991).
223 See generally 33 C.F.R. §§ 1.07-55, 326.6(i) (1991).

224 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,028-31 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
(proposed July 1, 1991).
225 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,028 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
posed July 1, 1991).
226 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,028 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
posed July 1, 1991).
227 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,030 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §
July 1, 1991).

§§ 28.22 & 28.25)
§ 28.22(a)) (pro§ 28.22(b)) (pro28.25) (proposed

228 Id.
229 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,028 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.21) (proposed

July 1, 1991).
230 33 C.F.R. §§ 1.07-25(b) & 3 2 6 .6 (g)(2) (1991).
231 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,028 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.21) (proposed
July 1, 1991).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1

Presiding Officer finds that the complaint states a cause of action. 2 2 The allegations in the complaint become the Presiding Officer's recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law.23 3
Where there has been default as to liability, EPA must submit "written argument (with any supporting documentation) regarding the
assessment of an appropriate civil penalty" to the Presiding Officer.234 Each of the separate statutes authorizing EPA's administrative penalties contains "factors" to be considered in setting the
penalty amount. 235 This requirement to justify the penalty amount
even in default cases is directly responsive to Katzson Bros., Inc. v.
EPA,23 6 which remanded a penalty assessment order because there
was no evidence of consideration of the statutory factors, even
though the defendant had never requested a hearing and a default
judgment had been entered against him.
Third, the EPA procedures contain provisions on a prehearing
conference and discovery. 23 7 There are no comparable Corps provisions, and the Coast Guard merely provides that generally the defendant may receive a free copy of all written evidence in the case
file. 23 8 EPA's prehearing conference, which may be conducted by

telephone,239 must be held not later than 30 days after the defendant's response to the complaint. 2 4 Its purpose is to schedule and
limit discovery, to simplify issues, and establish the time and place
for the proceeding on the merits. 24 ' The proposed regulations

specify that the Presiding Officer issue a prehearing order memorializing rulings in the conference within 20 days of the conference 242 and that the hearing on the merits occur not sooner than
30 days following the conference and not sooner than seven days
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 56 Fed. Reg. 30,028 (1991)

(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.21(b) (proposed

July 1, 1991).
235 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,028 (1991)

(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.21(b)) (pro-

posed July 1, 1991).
236 839 F.2d 1396 (10th Cir. 1988).
237 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,029 (1991)

(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 28.23 & 28.24)

(proposedJuly 1, 1991).
238 33 C.F.R. § 1.07-30 (1991).
239 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,029 (1991)

(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.23(a)) (pro-

posedJuly 1, 1991).
240 Id.

241 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,029 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.23(b)) (proposedJuly 1, 1991).
242 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,029 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.23(d)) (proposed July 1, 1991).
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after completion of discovery. 2 43
Discovery is denominated "information exchange" and is limited by the proposed regulation to the name of each witness, a
brief description of the witness's connection to the case, the witness's qualifications (if the person is to be an expert witness), the
subject matter of the intended testimony, and a copy of any documents intended to be introduced. 2 44 In addition, EPA is allowed to
require the defendant to produce any information relating to the
defendant's net profits, delayed or avoided costs or other benefit
derived from the alleged violation, as well as any information relevant to defendant's inability to pay a penalty. 24 5 The defendant,
however, is precluded from discovering the basis for a proposed
penalty amount, 246 and the proposed regulation prohibits the Presiding Officer from requiring any discovery not mandated in the
regulation. 4 7
Fourth, the EPA proposed regulations bifurcate the administrative proceeding into two components: a liability determination
and a penalty determination. For example, while the proposed
regulations presume the right of participants to introduce testimony as to liability, only if there is "a compelling need for additional fact-finding on issues material to remedy" is the Presiding
Officer granted discretion to allow testimony as to penalty. 24 This
arises from EPA's view that, whereas decisions as to liability involve
questions of fact as to which EPA has the burden of proof,24 9 "penalty issues are matters of persuasion rather than proof."2 0 Thus,
EPA envisions hearings as to liability, but only argument with respect to penalty amount. Moreover, whereas EPA has the burden
of going forward with respect to establishing liability, the defendant has the burden of going forward to show that the penalty requested should not be granted. 25 1 This differs from EPA practice
in formal, APA adjudications. 5 2
243 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,029 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.23(c)) (proposedJuly 1, 1991).
244 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,029 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.24(b) (1)) (proposedJuly 1, 1991).
245 Id.
246 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,006 (1991).
247 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,015 (1991).
248 56 Fed. Reg. 30,031 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.26(h)) (proposed
July 1, 1991).
249 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,006 (1991).
250 Id.
251 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,025 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.10(b)) (proposed July 1, 1991). See also 56 Fed. Reg. 30,006 (1991).
252 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,009 (1991).
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The proposed regulation is not entirely clear, but EPA appears
to suggest that it may include the statutory maximum penalty in its
complaint without any underlying support. 2 " If the defendant
does not meet its burden of going forward to reduce that amount,
EPA need not submit any evidence on the penalty amount.2 5 4 Only
in the course of its "argument" as to application of the appropriate
penalty factors, after liability has been established, might EPA even
indicate the actual penalty amount requested. Presumably, this
strategy provides an additional incentive for defendants to settle.
Fifth, to assure expedition, the proposed regulation sets strict
page limits on written arguments 2 55 and strict time limits for every
25 6
stage of the proceeding.
Finally, unlike the Coast Guard and Corps regulations, the
EPA proposed regulation places the Presiding Officer under severe
restraints, rather than relying upon her discretion. This is most
apparent in Proposed Section 28.4, which purports to list all the
authorities and duties of the Presiding Officer, and which contains
various limitations on the Presiding Officer. 2 57 Failure to fulfill
these duties or a violation of these limitations may result in removal of the Presiding Officer. 5 8 Although the limitations to assure the Presiding Officer's neutrality are unexceptional, other
limitations on the Presiding Officer are noteworthy. First, EPA enforces the limitation on discovery by allowing for removal of the
Presiding Officer if she grants any delay, continuance, or stay to a
participant because the participant is awaiting information sought
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).259 While EPA cannot restrict a defendant's (or commenter's) ability to make FOIA
requests for whatever reason, including discovery, EPA can effectively limit the usefulness of the FOIA by setting time schedules,
such that the requester would be unlikely to receive a response in
time. Were the defendant able to obtain a stay or delay, however,
See 56 Fed. Reg. 29,999, 30,008-09 (1991).
See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,006 (1991). The preamble states, however, that "in the absence of any support" in the record the Regional Administrator "should" impose only
a "token or symbolic amount." Id.
255 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,024 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.8) (proposed
July 1, 1991).
256 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,027, 30,029 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 28.20,
28.23 & 28.24(c)) (proposedJuly 1, 1991).
257 56 Fed. Reg. 30,023-24 (1991).
258 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,025 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.13(a)) (proposedJuly 1, 1991).
259 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,024 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.4(c) (4)) (proposed July 1, 1991). See also 56 Fed. Reg. 30,004 (1991).
253

254
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perhaps FOIA requests could be successful. This limitation assures
that FOIA will not be a useful tool. Second, the Presiding Officer
may be removed if she allows the introduction of any evidence relating to the settlement of any action. 260 This reflects an underlying concern of EPA's not to allow its policies or practices regarding
settlements of violations to affect its prosecution of violations.26 '
Presumably, EPA fears that defendants will argue that under similar circumstances others have settled for far less, hoping that the
Presiding Officer will set a like penalty amount. It is important to
EPA to maintain substantial differentials between penalties imposed by settlement and those imposed by order so as to create a
significant incentive to settle. Third, the Presiding Officer may be
removed if she hears or considers any challenge to a final State or
EPA action, including a permit issuance.262 Clearly, EPA does not
want the administrative proceeding to become a forum for a challenge to the lawfulness of the underlying legal requirements alleged to have been violated. Fourth, the Presiding Officer may be
removed for dismissing the administrative complaint. 26 Under
EPA's scheme, if the Presiding Officer believes an administrative
complaint is defective, she has no authority to dismiss it. Rather
she is limited to recommending its withdrawal to the Regional Administrator. 24 None of these substantive policies is particularly objectionable, but as even EPA notes, to make their violation grounds
265
for removal of a Presiding Officer "goes beyond the usual."
After the proceeding before the Presiding Officer, both the
Corps and EPA procedures require the Presiding Officer to send a
recommended decision to the District Engineer and Regional Administrator, respectively.2 66 Unlike the procedure under the
260 56 Fed. Reg. 30,024 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.4(c) (5)) (proposed

July 1, 1991).
261 See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 30,001 (1991) (discussing content of administrative
record).
262 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,024 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.4(c)(6)) (proposed July 1, 1991).
263 56 Fed. Reg. 30,024 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.4(c) (7)) (proposed
July 1, 1991).
264 See56 Fed. Reg. 30,023 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.2(r)) (proposed
July 1, 1991). Under the Coast Guard procedures, the Hearing Officer may dismiss a
case without prejudice once, but thereafter the Hearing Officer may dismiss the complaint with prejudice. 33 C.F.R. § 1.07-65(a) (1991).
265 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,007 (1991) (discussing request for alternate Presiding
Officer).
266 56 Fed. Reg. 30,032 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.27) (proposedJuly
1, 1991); 33 C.F.R. § 326.6(j) (1991).
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APA,26 7 the parties have no opportunity to comment on the recommended decision before the superior makes the final decision.
Under the Coast Guard procedures, the Hearing Officer actually
makes the final decision. 268 Neither the Corps nor EPA provide for
an administrative appeal of a final penalty assessment. EPA goes
one step further, specifically prohibiting any request for reconsideration or administrative appeal. 269 Moreover, any attempt to appeal is defined as a "prohibited communication" that can lead to
sanctions against the "appellant."27 0

The Coast Guard, on the

other hand, provides for an administrative appeal to the Commandant of the Coast Guard.27 '
Emphasis on settlement is explicit in the EPA proposed
rules.2 72 The strict, 30-day deadline for an answer to the complaint
is automatically extended 30 days if the defendant files notice of a
settlement offer,2 73 and with EPA's agreement can be extended 90

days.274 Settlement can be reached and confirmed in a consent
order at any time before final EPA action. 275 The proposed regulations allow the Presiding Officer no role in the settlement negotiations or the issuance of any consent order. 276 Except in Clean
Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act cases in which commenters
have participated, the regional enforcement office and the defendant may negotiate a final consent order without the need to obtain
approval of either the Presiding Officer or the Regional Administrator.277 Where members of the public have become participants
in Clean Water Act or Safe Drinking Water Act cases, the consent
order must be approved by the Regional Administrator, who may
267 See 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1988).

268 33 C.F.R. § 1.07-65 (1991).

269 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,026 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.14) (proposed
July 1, 1991).

270 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,023 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.2(p)) (proposed
July 1, 1991).
271 33 C.F.R. § 1.07-70-75 (1991).
272 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,012 (1991)

("EPA favors the resolution of disputes in the

most timely and effective manner possible, and is particularly concerned that
burden small or unsophisticated respondents with unnecessary proceedings....
sequently, these proposed rules favor the settlements of disputes.").
273 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,027 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.20(b) (2))
posed July 1, 1991).
274 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,027 (1991) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. § 28.20(b)(1))
posed July 1, 1991).
275 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,028 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.22(a))
posed July 1, 1991).
276

See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,013-14 (1991).
id.

277 See

it not
Con(pro(pro(pro-
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require the settling parties to explain in writing the legality of the
consent order.27 8
IV.

THE EXPERIENCE AT

EPA279

The position of "Presiding Officer" at EPA is not limited to the
function of adjudicating informal penalty proceedings. 2 0 EPA assigns other informal adjudications to Presiding Officers 28 1 and, de22
pending upon the region, other non-formal public hearings.
For example, under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, if persons are convicted of criminal violations, they are placed on a list
of persons barred from performing any government contract at the
facility involved until EPA determines that the condition has been
corrected. 283 Under EPA's regulations, the hearings governing
278 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,028 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.22(b)) (proposedJuly 1, 1991).
279 As indicated in Part I of this Article, the Coast Guard's experience with informal
penalty procedures predates EPA's. Moreover, in the volume of cases the Coast
Guard dwarfs EPA, processing some 20,000 informal penalty cases a year. SeeJohn H.
Frye III, Survey of Non-ALJ HearingPrograms In The Federal Govemment ADMIN. L. REv.
261, 283 (1992). These cases arise under a number of statutes. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.
§§ 495(b), 499(c), 502(c), 1232(a), 1236, 1321(b)(6), 1608, 2072, 2107 (1988 &
Supp. III 1990); 46 U.S.C. § 2107 (1988); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1809 (Supp. III 1990).
Many of the penalties under these provisions amount to the equivalent of traffic
tickets for pleasure boats. See, e.g., Green v. United States Coast Guard, 642 F. Supp.
638 (N.D. I1. 1986). Only 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (6) (B) (i) (Supp. III 1990), however,
expressly authorizes a non-APA proceeding. While the Coast Guard says that it uses
its informal procedures under 33 C.F.R. 1.07 for all its civil penalty enforcement, see
33 C.F.R. § 1.07-1 (1991), this obviously cannot be true for those civil penalties
expressly required to be conducted pursuant to the APA. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321(b) (6) (B) (Supp. III 1990). Moreover, as indicated in Part I, while the Coast
Guard has been generally successful in its attempts to deny de novo review of its
informal administrative penalty determinations, the case law is sufficiently confused
not to rule out the possibility of a successful challenge. Despite this caseload, the
Coast Guard has only 10 Hearing Officers, who are headquartered in the various
Coast Guard districts. See Frye, supra, at 283. This is explained by the fact that only
five-to-seven percent of the cases involve hearings. Id.
Because of the peculiarities of the Coast Guard's penalty regime and the inability
readily to compare it to a formal adjudication regime, the focus of this Article is on
EPA's implementation.
280 To confuse the issue, EPA regulations use the term "presiding officer" to refer
not only to non-ALJ presiding officers, but also to those ALJs designated to be "presiding officers" in particular, formal adjudications. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 27.11 (1991). In
this Article, the term "presiding officer" will be used to refer only to non-ALJ hearing
officers.
281 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 24.09, 24.13 & 222.6 (1991). See also 40 C.F.R. § 124,119
(1991) (ALJ normally responsible for hearing, but upon agreement of parties a nonALJ presiding officer may be assigned).
282 See genera/.y EPA, REGIONAL PRESImING OFFICER/REGIONAL JUDICIAL OFFICER AcCOMP,,sHMENTs REPORT 1 (November 1992) [hereinafter AccoMPusHsMzNrs REPORT].

283 See 33 U.S.C § 1368 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 7606 (Supp. III 1990).
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those lists are conducted by "case examiners, "284 who are Presiding
Officers.285 Moreover, there is a related position of "RegionalJudicial Officer" to which the Regional Administrator may delegate her
authority to act in formal APA penalty proceedings.286 As a matter
of practice, several Regional Judicial Officers have been authorized
to issue final orders on consent and on default and to handle preanswer motions in these formal proceedings. 8 7 Unlike a "Presiding Officer," a Regional Judicial Officer cannot be employed by the
Region's enforcement office or by the office associated with the
violation at issue. 288
Most regions have appointed one attorney to be both the
standing Presiding Officer and Regional Judicial Officer.289 While
EPA's workload model indicates that this standing position constitutes only three-tenths of a work year, several regions have found it
to require more resources than the model indicates. 0 The persons appointed to these positions in January 1990 formed a workgroup to share information and experiences. 291
Most, if not all, of the Regional Presiding Officers are experienced enforcement attorneys with substantial background enforcing the types of cases that they would be called upon to adjudicate.
There is some question how the assignment as a Presiding Officer
affects one's career path. Apparently, it is not seen as a step up,
but as more a lateral, part-time assignment. Among younger, ambitious attorneys, such a position might be viewed as actually interfering with their plans for advancement. Because the Presiding
Officers who have been assigned are for the most part senior attorneys who probably have already reached the peak of their career
ladder before their assignment, this issue does not seem to have
raised problems.
A related issue is the system for evaluating Presiding Officers.
In those regions where the Judicial Officer and Presiding Officer
are not the same standing position, the person acting as Presiding
Officer is likely to come from the office of Regional Counsel and
may continue to be evaluated by the Regional Counsel, as head of
enforcement within the region. This is understandable in light of
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291

See 40 C.F.R. § 15.4 (1991).
See AccoMPusHmENTs REPORT, supra note 282, at 6.
See 40 C.F.R. § 22.04(3) (1991).
See AccoMpus mawrs REPORT, supra note 282, at 5.
See 40 C.F.R. § 22.04(2) (1991).
See AccoMPusHwN{rs REPORT, supra note 282, at 2.
See id. at 7-8.
See id. at 2.
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the fact that the person probably only acts as Presiding Officer on a
part-time basis and as an enforcement attorney for the remainder
of her time. Most regions have not adopted this model, however.
In Region IX, for example, the Regional Administrator is the perPresiding Officer does
son who rates the Presiding Officer, and2 the
92
enforcement.
in
role
not have an active
At EPA, the total volume of administrative actions, including
formal and informal, penalty and compliance actions, is on the order of 4000 per year. 293 Of these, about 1400 are administrative
penalty cases.29 4 Unfortunately, EPA does not break this figure
down into informal and formal proceedings. The Office of Wastewater Enforcement and Compliance, however, does maintain some
statistics distinguishing between its formal and informal penalty
proceedings. Of the total of 242 proposed administrative penalty
orders for violations of NPDES permits or pretreatment standards
in FY 1991, 191 were proposed Class I (informal) penalties and 91
were Class II (formal) penalties. 95 While these figures do not include all the informal administrative penalty cases, 296 of the other
programs utilizing informal administrative penalties only the Safe
Drinking Water Underground Injection Control (UIC) program
involves numbers of cases comparable to the NPDES and pretreatment program enforcement. 97 This suggests that the overwhelming proportion of the 1400 administrative penalty cases in FY90
were pursuant to formal proceedings.
The Clean Water Act Class I penalty cases are not spread
evenly among EPA's ten regions. Thus, in FY90 Regions 4 and 6
each accounted for more than one-third of all the proposed Class I
administrative penalty orders issued, while none of the remaining
292
293

Phone interview with Steven Anderson, Region IX Presiding Officer, July 1991.
REPORT, FY 1990, 3-3 (February
See EPA, ENFORCEMENT AccoMPLISHMENTs

1991).
294 See OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT, COMPLIANCE
TIONAL PENALTY REPORT, OVERVIEW OF

EPA

PoLIcY

AND PLANNING BRANCH, NA-

FEDERAL PENALTY PRACTICES,

FY 1990 7

(April 1991).
295 See EPA, OFFICE OF WASTEWATER ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE, ENFORCEMENT
DIVISION, PoLicY DEVELOPMENT BRANCH, FY 1991 ADMINISrRATIVE ENFORCEMENT REPORT 4 (April 1992) [hereinafter FY 1991 ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT REPORT].

296 Specifically, they do not include Safe Drinking Water Underground Injection
Control (UIC) cases, CERCLA cases, Section 404 cases, or Oil Pollution Act cases.
297 In Region II, there were fifteen informal penalty proceedings in UIC cases compared with seven informal penalty proceedings in Clean Water Act cases. See Attach-

ment to letter from Charles E. Hoffman, Assistant Branch Chief, Water, Grants and
General Law Branch, Region II, U.S.E.P.A., to William Funk, dated September 26,
1991 [hereinafter Hoffman etter] (on file with author).
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regions had as many as ten, and two regions had none at all.20 8

These differences reflect both different regional enforcement strat2
egies and differences in state environmental enforcement. 99
The number of informal penalty cases brought (or disposed
of) by EPA, however, may not accurately reflect the load placed on
Presiding Officers. On the one hand, they may understate the
load. Regional Presiding Officers/Judicial Officers may be assigned duties not related to informal penalty proceedings.' ° For
example, in Region 10 the Presiding Officer in FY90 was assigned
to conduct over 40 "public hearings," non-adjudicatory hearings
such as NEPA hearings or public participation hearings under various environmental statutes.0 1 In Region 9, the Regional Judicial
Officer was assigned to hear pre-hearing motions in over 130 cases
in both FY91 and FY92.30 2
On the other hand, the number of penalty cases may imply a
greater load than exists. Class I penalty cases can be disposed of
without involving a Presiding Officer. Under the guidance in effect at the time, 03 a Presiding Officer was only assigned to a case
when a defendant requested a hearing. Thus, if a defendant simply did not respond to a complaint or settled with EPA without
requesting a hearing, no Presiding Officer would have been assigned, but a proposed and final administrative penalty order
would have been issued. This may explain why, for example, despite Region 6's 44 proposed Class I penalty orders in FY90, only
about five cases were assigned to the Regional Presiding Officer. 0 4
As a matter of statistics, this discrepancy should disappear under
EPA's proposed regulations, because the Regional Administrator is
to designate a Presiding Officer not later than 20 days after service
of the complaint. 0 5 Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that the
vast majority of informal penalty cases never involve a Presiding
Officer in a meaningful way. This is consistent with the fact that all
298 Memorandum from Richard G. Kozlowski, Director, Enforcement Division, to
Regional Water Management Division Directors, Use of Administrative Penalty Orders (APOs) in FY90 [hereinafter 1991 Kozlowski Memorandum], March 14, 1991, at
Appendix (FY90 Proposed APOs By Region).
299 For example, the fact that Region 10 brought no cases in Washington but
brought eleven in Alaska reflects Washington's aggressive environmental enforcement and Alaska's non-enforcement of the Clean Water Act.
300 See supra notes 280-88 and accompanying text.
301 See ACCOMPUISHMEN rS REPORT, supra note 282, Table 6.
302 See id. at Table 5.
303 See 52 Fed. Reg. 30,730 (1987).
304 See ACCOMPUtSHmENTS REPORT, supra note 282, Table 4.
305 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,027 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.16(h)) (proposed July 1, 1991).
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30 6
but a very few informal penalty cases are settled.
Further evidence of the limited role of Presiding Officers is
the corpus of written decisions they have rendered. In FY90, Regional Presiding Officers/Judicial Officers issued written decisions
in 16 cases, only five of which were informal penalty cases.' ° 7 In
FY91, there were written decisions in 14 new cases, only six of
which were informal penalty cases. 308 In FY92, there were written
decisions in 19 new cases, only seven of which were informal penalty cases.
Settlement, rather than litigation, is also the norm for Class II
penalties and other administrative penalties for which formal adjudication would be required.310 As a result, figures comparing the
average time to conclude Class I and Class II penalty orders3 " are
not measurements of the time saved by the informal proceeding as
compared to a formal, APA adjudication. Nevertheless, the average time for resolution of Class I penalties is less than that for Class
II penalties.3 s 2

FY 88
FY89
FY 90
FY 91

Average Days for
Glass I Penalties
129
136
169
167

Average Days for
Class II Penalties
152
210
247
242

See letter from Robert A. DiBiccaro, Regional Presiding Officer/Judicial Officer,
Region I, U.S.E.P.A., to William Funk, dated September 26, 1991 (showing that of the
27 informal civil penalty cases begun and concluded in Region I between October 1,
1988, andJuly 15, 1991, all were settled); Hoffman letter, supra note 297 (stating that of
the 18 Class I Clean Water Act cases brought and concluded between February 1989
and February 1991, none required hearings, with 17 settling, and that with respect to
the nine outstanding cases, only one will require a written decision).
306

307

See

ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT,

supra note 282, Appendix, Cumulative List of

Decisions.
308 See id.
309 See id.
310 I have found no statistics to support this statement, but everyone I talk to involved in EPA enforcement says this is the case.
311 This is the average time from the issuance of the proposed order, which is the
equivalent of a complaint, and a final order.
312 See 1991 Kozlowski Memorandum, supra note 298, at 9; Memorandum from Richard G. Kozlowski, Director, Enforcement Division, Office of Water, U.S.E.P.A., to
Compliance Branch Chiefs and Regional Counsels, re: Use of Administrative Penalty
Orders (APSs) in FY 89, dated March 13, 1990 [hereinafter 1990 Kozlowski Memorandum], at 6; FY 1991 ADMiISTRATIvE ENFORcEmENT REPORT, supra note 295, at 9-10.
The rapidly increasing length of time for both Class I and Class II penalty proceedings

46
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Those involved in the process perceive the reason for the
greater period of time for resolving Class II penalties as the fact
that Class II penalties are for larger dollar amounts than Class I
penalties, and therefore demand and justify greater attention.3 1 3
V.
A.

THE ISSUES

Due Process

A fundamental question is whether the "informal" administrative procedures adopted by EPA, the Corps of Engineers, and the
Coast Guard satisfy the requirements of procedural due process for
the assessment of monetary penalties. The paucity of case law on
the subject means that the answer cannot be certain, but at the
same time the lack of serious constitutional challenge suggests that
litigants have not thought it to be worth the effort.
Earlier, this Article addressed the Mathews v. Eldridge three-factor test for determining the required due process procedures.
There, the conclusion was that, given the variety of different types
of administrative penalties, it was not possible to state a meaningful
from 1989 and 1990 probably is the result of the rapidly increasing number of proposed orders being issued in 1988 and 1989 without a concomitant increase in personnel and resources. The 1991 reduction in time would be explained by the
decrease in proposed orders in 1990.
313 See Hoffman letter, supra note 297, at 2; Interview with Elyse DiBiagio-Wood, Office of Enforcement, U.S.E.PA, Washington, D.C. (October 9, 1991); Phone interview with Theodore Rogowski, Office of Regional Counsel, Region X, U.S.E.P.A. (July
2, 1991).
Within the categories of Class I and Class II penalties, the faster cases were not
necessarily the smaller cases. Indeed, generally, the faster cases were those that settled for greater than average penalties. See 1991 Kozlowski Memorandum, supra note
298, at 9; 1990 Kozlowski Memorandum, supra note 312, at 7; FY 1991 ADMrNIsTRATrwE
ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 295, at 10.

FYs89
F 90

FY91

Average
Penalty in
Slower than
Average
Class I
Penalty Cases
5;7.651

Average
Penalty in
Faster than
Average
Class I
Penalty Cases
58,715

Average
Penalty in
Slower than
Average
Class II
Penalty Cases
5;30.200

Average
Penalty in
Faster than
Average
Class II
Penalty Cases
5;49,631

$8,641
N/,AN/A

$7,572

$43,663

$52,462

546.697

55946

It is possible that within each class of penalty, the higher penalties reflect cases where
the violations are most clear cut and the mitigating factors relatively insubstantial, so
that there simply is not as much to negotiate about. Similarly, the lower penalties
might reflect cases where the violations are less clear or the mitigating factors are
more substantial, so that more time is required to negotiate a proper resolution.
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general requirement. It may be possible, however, to find more
guidance with respect to a particular set of administrative procedures. Accordingly, I will focus on EPA's proposed Part 28 rules in
terms of due process requirements.
As indicated before, Mathews v. Eldridge establishes a three-factor test to assess the adequacy of any given set of procedures. The
first factor is the private interest involved. The private interest involved in EPA's penalty provisions is primarily the cost of the penalty. Even within the relatively limited universe of EPA's informal
administrative penalty provisions, there is substantial variation in
the potential cost. Thus, under the UIC Safe Drinking Water provisions EPA may impose a maximum administrative penalty of
$125,000 without subjecting the hearing to the requirements of the
APA;3 14 under the Clean Water Act the maximum amount of a
Class I penalty is $25,000.115 Nevertheless, these penalties are substantial in everyday terms and thus should elevate the private interest in sufficient procedures to a high level. Moreover, beyond the
mere monetary cost of the penalty, for most persons there is a cost
to reputation in being determined a law-breaker, even if in the relatively arcane world of environmental regulation. Indeed, for
many companies, to be deemed a violator of environmental standards may seriously impact its relations with its neighbors and its
status with customers. Finally, the private interest affected is affected forever. Unlike many of the cases raising due process issues,3 16 the informal procedure contained in EPA's proposed Part
28 is not to make a temporary determination pending a final and
formal adjudication of the issues. Rather it is the final
determination.
The second Mathews factor is the risk of an erroneous determination as a result of informal procedures and the likely improvement that would result from more formal procedures. This factor
is undoubtedly the most important, because unless there is harm
caused by the informal procedures, which can be relieved or mitigated by more formal procedures, there is little reason to make the
procedures more formal, no matter what the relative weight of the
See 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(c) (1988).
See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (g) (2) (A) (1988).
316 See, e.g., Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252 (1987) (procedures used
to order temporary reinstatement of discharged employees pending final determination); Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (procedures used to
terminate employee for cause pending final determination); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976) (procedures used to terminate disability benefits pending final
determination).
314
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private and government interests.3 17 To apply this factor, one must
focus on two issues: the nature of the determinations the adjudication is to make and, in light of the nature of those determinations,
what additional procedures might reduce error.
The nature of the determinations to be made is important,
because the appropriateness or desirability of a particular procedural enhancement may turn on the nature of the factual determination to be made.""8 In Mathews, for example, the Court found
direct and cross-examination to be unnecessary to determine the
accuracy of the medical assessments of a person's impairment, because adjudicatory procedures used to determine the credibility
and veracity of a witness were largely irrelevant to evaluate medical
determinations."9 In many EPA cases, the factual issues as to the
presence of a violation are likely to involve written reports concerning pollution discharges and laboratory testing or on-site monitoring of the discharge. 20 A review of the handful of informal penalty
determinations which have actually been litigated before a Presiding Officer indicates that factual issues do not predominate and
those that exist do not seem to demand trial-type techniques to
resolve them.3 2 '
As EPA's proposed Part 28 procedures recognize, a determination of a violation is only half the proceeding. There remains the
issue of the amount of the penalty to be assessed. Under each of
the penalty provisions, EPA is required to consider various factors
in setting the penalty amount. 322 Several of these are heavily based
317 This statement reflects a strictly utilitarian, risk/benefit view of the Mathews test.
While this is undoubtedly the thrust of Mathews, there are those who believe that the
calculus perhaps should reflect other values as well. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, The
Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976). Occasionally, members of the Supreme Court have suggested relevant other factors as well.
Cf Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 274 n.2 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (suggesting different considerations apply when government affects "traditionally guaranteed" rights rather than "new property").
318 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-44 (1976).
319 Id.
320 Cf Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1484 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
321 See, e.g., In re Ashland Oil, Inc., Floreffe, Pa. Facility, Docket No. PA-88-0001,
Order denying motion for accelerated decision, dated May 14, 1990 (deciding that
whether a change in oil tank size materially affected the potential for the discharge of
oil into navigable waters was a disputed material fact requiring a hearing).
322 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (3) (1988) ("the nature, circumstances, extent and gravity of the violation, or violations, and, with respect to the violator, ability to pay, any
prior history of such violations, the degree of culpability, economic benefit or savings
(if any) resulting from the violation, and such other matters asjustice may require.");
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upon facts that may be disputed. This is particularly true of questions regarding the degree of culpability and the extent of eco3 23
nomic benefit or savings attributable to the violation.
Nevertheless, most of these questions too seem not to call for trialtype techniques as the most effective means of determining truth.
Unlike Mathews and similar cases, however, the asserted deficiencies in EPA's procedures do not directly relate to trial-type procedures involving direct and cross-examination of witnesses.
Compared to many "informal" proceedings, EPA's proposed Part
28 procedures retain most of the trial-type procedures of a formal
adjudication. This is not to say that there are not procedures that
might increase accuracy of determinations.
The most obvious complaint with EPA's procedures is the
identity of the Presiding Officer. The failure to assure that he or
she is not involved in enforcement activities was the primary objec3 24
tion made in the public comments on EPA's proposed rule.
This objection has two aspects. First, the commenters believed that
senior attorneys from the enforcement office would likely have a
built-in enforcement bias or mind-set that would detract from being a neutral Presiding Officer. Certainly it conforms to ordinary
experience that persons who have been enforcers for a substantial
number of years tend to approach related legal issues from an enforcer's perspective. While it is not unheard of for federal or state
judges, or even ALJs, to come from an enforcement background, at
42 U.S.C. § 9609(a) (3) (1988) (same); 42 U.S.C. § 11045(b) (1) (C) (1988) (same). 33
U.S.C. § 1321(b) (8) (Supp. III 1990) ("the seriousness of the violation or violations,
the economic benefit to the violator, if any, resulting from the violation, the degree of
culpability involved, any other penalty for the same incident, any history of prior violations, the nature, extent, and degree of success of any efforts of the violator to minimize or mitigate the effects of the discharge, the economic impact of the penalty on
the violator, and any other matters as justice may require"); 42 U.S.C. § 300h2(c) (4) (B) (1988) ("(i) the seriousness of the violation; (ii) the economic benefit (if
any) resulting from the violation; (iii) any history of such violations; (iv) any goodfaith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements; (v) the economic impact of
the penalty on the violator; and (vi) such other matters as justice may require.").
323 The extent of economic benefit or savings resulting from the violation is determined by EPA according to its BEN computer model. See generalyJonathan D. Libber, Penalty Assessment at the EnvironmentalProtection Agency: A riewfrom Inside, 35 S.D.
L. REV. 189 (1990).
324 See Comments of American Paper Institute and National Forest Products Ass'n,
August 30, 1991, at 2; Duquesne Light, August 30, 1991, at 7; McDonnel Douglas,
August 30, 1991, at 1; Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n, August 30, 1991, at 6; Barnes &
Thornburg, August 30, 1991, at 1; Piper & Marbury for Edison Electric Institute, August 30, 1991, at 3, 10; Texaco, August 26, 1991, at 1; Eli Lilly, August 30, 1991, at 2;
Coalition for Clean Air Implementation, August 30, 1991, at 7; Hunton & Williams for
Utility Air Regulation Group, August 30, 1991, at 3; Cincinnati Gas & Electric, August
21, 1991, at 1.
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least once they have ascended the bench, they will not be called
upon to continue to exercise an enforcement orientation. This is
potentially different for EPA's Presiding Officers, who may continue to exercise enforcement office functions, so long as it is not
on a case in which they are presiding. The second aspect of the
commenters' objection is that Presiding Officers can continue to
be evaluated for pay and advancement purposes by the enforcement office of EPA. One need not assume that Presiding Officers
will curry favor with their supervisors by consciously making
favorable rulings to fear that an unconscious anxiety of subtle reprisal might affect a close ruling.
The case law is clear that it is not a per se violation of due
2
process to combine the functions of prosecutor and adjudicator. 1
The leading case on the subject, Withrow v. Larkin,-26 set a high
threshold for claims of unconstitutional bias or prejudice. In challenging a particular adjudication, a complainant must "overcome
the presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators" and must show "a risk of actual bias or prejudgment
...."327 Consequently, the possible enforcement bias or enforcement "mind-set" of a Presiding Officer or the fact that the Presiding Officer might be subject to evaluation by enforcement
personnel would not necessarily violate due process. Nevertheless,
this does not rule out including such considerations as part of the
Mathews factor, because they might affect the possible accuracy of
determinations. By requiring the Presiding Officer to be an ALJ or
an attorney not from or subject to enforcement personnel, EPA
could eliminate this possible source of inaccurate determinations.
It should be noted that this possible threat to accuracy does
not rely on the nature of the determinations to be made. Indeed,
to the extent that the determinations are technical in nature, any
enforcement bias or mind-set might increase the likelihood of inaccuracy by imbedding the Presiding Officer's EPA-orientation on
technical issues.
Besides the absence of an ALJ as presiding officer, probably
the other feature of the Part 28 procedures which most differs
from a formal, APA adjudication is the inability of parties to com325 See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975); Chemical Waste Management,
Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding EPA's Presiding Officer
under Part 24 procedures not a violation of due process by reason of possible relationship to enforcement activities).
326 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
327 Id. at 47.
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ment on the presiding officer's proposed decision. 2 8 This also was
a feature uniformly criticized by commenters on EPA's proposed
rule. 2 9 In its preamble to the proposed rule even EPA drew attention to this decision."3 ' EPA indicated that one case raises a due
process concern about denying parties an opportunity to comment
on proposed decisions, but EPA found that case to be
distinguishable.
The one case is Koniag,Inc., the Village of Uyak v. Andrus."s1 In
that case, the Secretary of Interior was responsible for determining
the eligibility of Native Alaskan villages to obtain lands under the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). While the APA did
not govern the means by which these determinations were to be
made, the Secretary adopted procedural regulations that provided
that initial determinations could be challenged in a de novo hearing
before an ALJ. Under this procedure, parties were permitted to
file proposed findings and conclusions to the ALJ, who in turn
made a recommended decision to the Secretary. But, as the D.C.
Circuit noted, "[a] t this point, the procedure veered from the usual
course of administrative law."332 The recommended decision was
not filed on the parties, and the parties were not able to file exceptions to the recommended decisions. The D.C. Circuit held this to
be a violation of due process. This conclusion derived from a combination of considerations. First, the court, citing Wong Yang Sung,
believed that the APA, and particularly § 557(c), guides the requirements imposed by due process, where there are no other prescribed statutory requirements. Second, citing Mathews v. Eldridge,
the court found that the great private interest involved and "the
minimal cost to administrative expediency""3 3 required the Secretary to allow parties to take exceptions to the ALJ's recommended
decisions and to submit briefs thereon. Third, ANCSA's statement
of congressional findings and purpose included the language that
the settlement of native lands "should be accomplished . . .with

maximum participation by Natives in decisions affecting their
rights and property," 3 4 and to deny Native Alaskans the ability to
328 Compare 56 Fed. Reg. 30,026 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R § 28.14) (proposed July 1, 1991) with 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1988).
329 See, e.g., Comments of American Paper Institute and National Forest Products
Association, August 30, 1991, at 6; Comments of Duquesne Light, August 30, 1991, at
3; Comments of Piper & Marbury for Edison Electric Institute, August 30, 1991, at 19.
330 See 56 Fed. Reg. 29,998 (1991).
331 580 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978).

332
333
334

Id. at 605.
Id. at 609.

43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (1988).
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take exceptions from proposed decisions was inconsistent with this
exhortation. Finally, while the parties were able to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the ALJ, these submissions apparently were not included in the record that was
submitted to the Secretary for the final decision.
Some of these considerations are not present under EPA's
proposed rule. Thus, where Congress has explicitly ruled out the
use of §§ 554, 556, and 557, it would seem inappropriate to use
§ 557's procedures as a model to determine the contours of due
process.33 5 Moreover, under EPA's proposed rule, when parties
are permitted to submit findings of fact and conclusions of law,
they are to be part of the record submitted to the Regional Administrator.3 36 However, EPA's proposed rule is less protective than
the procedures in Koniag to the extent that it does not assure that
parties will be able to submit findings of fact and conclusions of law
at all. Instead, this is left to the discretion of the Presiding Officer.3 3 7 Consequently, the failure to assure that parties will be able
to submit either findings and conclusions or exceptions to a proposed decision makes the proposed rule much like the procedures
in Koniag. EPA further distinguished Koniag in the preamble to its
proposed rule by stating that there is no equivalent in the statutes
creating the administrative penalties to ANCSA's exhortation to
provide "maximum participation" to parties involved. Instead,
Congress called for expedited enforcement procedures. 3 8 This is
true, but it should be noted that ANCSA's statement of congressional findings and purpose also explicitly called for expedition,
stating that the settlement process "should be accomplished ...
rapidly, with certainty, without litigation. ...

-"33 The D.C. Circuit

apparently did not perceive a requirement to allow parties to file
exceptions from recommended decisions to interfere with this purpose of ANCSA.
Nevertheless, the most important consideration must be the
Mathews analysis. Here, the D.C. Circuit's Mathews calculus in
Koniagwould seem quite comparable. That is, parties' interest in
See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,021, 30031-32 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§§ 28.2(b) (9), 28.26(k) & 28.27(a) (2)) (proposed July 1, 1991).
337 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,031 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.26(k)) (proposed July 1, 1991). Here is an example where the lack of a truly neutral Presiding
Officer might have substantial impacts on the fairness and accuracy of the
decisionmaking.
338 56 Fed. Reg. 29,998 (1991).
339 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (1988).
335
336
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and there
the penalty proceedings is of "great importance,"
seems little reason why the "minimal cost to administrative efficiency" in Koniag3 4 ' would be any higher for EPA in penalty proceedings. Given the evidence that very few penalty cases ever get to
the recommended decision stage,' 2 to allow parties to file exceptions to recommended decisions would seem to have little effect on
EPA's enforcement.
All this being said, Koniag does not seem to be a strong case
upon which to rely for its due process analysis. The D.C. Circuit's
activism in fine-tuning the agency's procedure in that case is out of
character with more recent Supreme Court and circuit court cases.
Whatever the merits of allowing comment on the Presiding Officer's recommended decisions,"' it stretches the notion of fundamental due process to include such a technical requirement.
More fundamentally, a number of other features of EPA's proposed regulation, which differ from what is provided in ordinary
formal adjudications or even what is provided in many informal
adjudications, might be said to affect the accuracy of the determinations. These were detailed at some length in Part 1III 4 They
include: EPA's shifting to the defendant of the burden of going
forward to show why the requested penalty amount should not be
granted, while prohibiting any discovery as to EPA's basis for the
proposed amount and generally not allowing the defendant to introduce testimonial evidence as to penalty amount; serious constraints placed upon the Presiding Officer's exercise of discretion,
including prohibitions on additional discovery beyond what is expressly provided in the regulation, on extending time for defendants to obtain information, and on the Presiding Officer dismissing
EPA's complaint; very short page limits on parties' legal submissions; and short, strict deadlines for every step of the process, with
default a threat at each stage. Individually, each of these limitations can be explained and perhaps justified. Indeed, an agency
might be able to impose many of these limitations by rule on formal, APA adjudications of a particular type. Nonetheless, viewed
together, especially in light of the lack of a functionally-neutral
hearing officer and the inability to file exceptions to a proposed
34o Koniag, Inc., the Village of Uyak v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 601, 609 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978).
341 Id.
342 See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
343 See infra note 355 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 229-78 and accompanying text.
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decision, one might conclude that there are a number of procedures which could be added to increase accuracy.
This raises the question of Mathews' third factor-the government's interest in not affording additional procedures. Here the
EPA's interest in general is to reduce the time and cost involved in
assessing penalties for violations. But this is notjust an end in itself
but also a means to more effective environmental regulation. The
argument is that to the extent that EPA can only enforce its regulations against violators by means of formal proceedings, EPA's enforcement efforts will necessarily be substantially limited. Such a
limitation will meaningfully reduce deterrence and predictably
lead to more violations."' It was this very argument that convinced
Congress to adopt the informal procedures.
If one assumes EPA's predicate to be true (that formal procedures necessarily would reduce enforcement), EPA's argument has
substantial weight. Nevertheless, the implication of the argument
may reduce that weight. That is, the same could be said for the
War on Drugs or any other law enforcement activity. The less procedural constraints on agencies in their adjudication of law violations and assessment of penalties, the easier it will be for those
agencies to enforce the law. This, however, cannot lead to a logical
conclusion that elimination of all procedural constraints isjustified
by the increased effectiveness of law enforcement. Thus, while effective law enforcement certainly is a positive government interest
worthy of consideration under Mathews' third factor, our conceptions of due process cannot give it overwhelming weight.
There is also a question of the accuracy of the assumption that
EPA's Part 28 procedures reduce the time and cost of enforcement
compared with formal procedures. The statistics quoted in Part IV
of this Article support EPA's view, but, as indicated there, it is not
clear whether informal penalties take less time because of the informal procedures. Rather, the persons involved in the process believe that the amount of money and inherent problems of the
particular case are the determinative factors in governing the time
and cost of the proceedings. The extent or existence of a causal
relationship between the procedures prescribed and the length of
time between proposal and final order has not been established
and may be questioned, especially because so few of the cases,
whether formal or informal, actually involve any adjudicatory proceedings. Absent a meaningful causal relationship between informal procedures and reduced time and cost of enforcement
345

56 Fed. Reg. 29,998 (1991).
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activities, the government's interest in the informal procedures becomes tenuous.
In assessing the government interest in avoiding additional
procedures, it may be worthwhile to focus on the EPA's response to
the primary complaint with the Proposed regulation. For example,
why not use ALJs instead of Presiding Officers, if that would meaningfully increase accuracy?
Initially, there is some question whether ALJs are rightfully
permitted to preside over non-APA adjudications, and many of
these penalty provisions explicitly bar APA adjudications.346 The
source of the question is 5 U.S.C. § 3105, which states that each
agency shall appoint "as many administrative law judges as are necessary for proceedings required to be conducted in accordance
with sections 556 and 557 of this title. Administrative law judges
...

may not perform duties inconsistent with their duties and re-

sponsibilities as administrative lawjudges." This language first suggests that an ALJ's responsibilities are to conduct proceedings
under §§ 556 and 557 and, second, that to conduct other proceedings might be inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities.
This interpretation, however, is hardly compelled. Agencies
do in fact use ALJs for non-APA proceedings. 47 Nevertheless, ALJs
348
tend to jealously guard their prerogatives and their neutrality,
and if they can be compelled to conduct proceedings that are not
the basis for their appointment, they may see this as an interference with their core duties. This would especially be true if the
non-APA proceedings became a major or the major portion of their
work. Inasmuch as EPA only has seven ALJs, were they to be used
for the non-APA penalty proceedings, they might consider that additional work substantially burdensome.
Indeed, EPA has suggested that assigning all its Part 28 penalty
proceedings to ALJs would "overwhelm" the agency's ALJs.3 49 As-

suming this to be true, EPA would not be able to appoint additional ALJs, because, as noted above, agencies are authorized to
appoint ALJs only as necessary to conduct formal APA proceedings. Similarly, while 5 U.S.C. § 3344 provides for the temporary
assignment of ALJs from other agencies when an agency "occasionally or temporarily is insufficiently staffed" with ALJs, it would be
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (g)(2)(A) (1988).
See, e.g., Koniag, Inc., the Village of Uyak v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978).
348 See, e.g., Debra Cassens Moss, Judges Under Fire,A.B.A.J., November 1991, at 56.
349 See 56 Fed. Reg. 29,998 (1991).
346
347
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extraordinary for the Office of Personnel Management to select
ALJs for assignment to an agency for non-APA adjudications. Moreover, EPA, like other agencies, would also likely be leery of using
Presiding Officers with no background in the substantive law being
adjudicated. Consequently, there seem to be insuperable obstacles
to routinely using ALJs for the informal penalty proceedings.
Nevertheless, it is not clear that other alternatives to assure
neutral Presiding Officers are not available. One suggestion made
by a commenter was that EPA use attorneys from the Office of General Counsel rather than enforcement. This would eliminate or
neutralize an enforcement bias or mind-set. Another suggestion
was that EPA use attorneys from different regions as Presiding Officers, presumably to avoid having the Presiding Officer subject to
the evaluation of the Regional Counsel or Administrator. Other
possibilities include making the Presiding Officer essentially a fulltime position subject to the evaluation of the Regional Administrator. This would eliminate the Presiding Officer at least prospectively from the evaluation and responsibilities of the enforcement
office.
The proposed Part 28 procedures do not preclude a Region
from using one or another means to assure neutrality, but they do
not require any more than that the Presiding Officer be "neutral to
the controversy. " 350 Ifgreater neutrality of the Presiding Officer
can be achieved without significant interference with EPA's operations or budget, it would seem advisable, if not compelled, for the
agency to achieve that neutrality. Not only would such an increase
in neutrality be desirable to increase both the reality and perception of fairness for their own sake, but it would also affect the Mathews' calculus with respect to other aspects of the informal penalty
procedures. That is, as Paul Verkuil has recently reminded us, 5 '
Henry Friendly's monumental "Some Kind of Hearing"3 52 suggests
that due process can accommodate trade-offs between the neutrality of the decisionmaker and the informality of procedures. 53 In
short, the judicialization of administrative procedures is partially a
response to a lack of true neutrality of the decisionmaker, the procedures constituting a felt need to constrain the decisionmaker. If,
350 56 Fed. Reg. 30,003 (1991). This is equally true of the procedures of the Corps
of Engineers. See 33 C.F.R. § 326.6(a) (3) (v), (h)(3) (1991). The Coast Guard insures
greater neutrality. See 33 C.F.R. § 1.07-15 (1991).
351 Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections Upon The FederalAdministrativeJudiciary,
39 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 1341, 1362 n.90 (1992).
352 Friendly, supra note 79.
353 Id. at 1279.
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however, the decisionmaker is truly neutral, the same need to formalize the process 3does
not exist, for we can trust to the fairness of
54
the decisionmaker

If we similarly ask what is EPA's interest specifically in not having parties be able to file exceptions to the Presiding Officer's recommended decision, EPA would likely respond that allowing such
exceptions would interfere with Congress's desire for streamlined
and expedited procedures. 55 Again, however, given the incredibly
small number of cases that reach a recommended decision stage, it
would seem that Congress's or EPA's desire for expedited procedures in general would be satisfied. Undoubtedly, providing for
filing exceptions would take additional time for EPA's enforcement personnel as well as the Regional Administrator in deciding
the case. If the defendant has pressed the case this far, however,
the additional time and effort is not likely to be significant as a
percentage of the total time and effort devoted to the case. Moreover, if the defendant has himself expended the time and effort to
press the case this far, it would seem more likely that the defendant
has a meritorious or, at least, contestable case. These cases probably should receive somewhat more attention.
In weighing the three Mathews factors in this case, it is clear
that the private interest is great, and it is relatively clear that EPA
could accede to many of the requests by commenters without significant cost to EPA or its enforcement efforts. At the same time,
the additional procedures that might be included to reduce the
risk of error, certainly individually, if not in combination, would
likely have only a marginal effect. On their face, it is difficult to
perceive the procedures precluding due process. If they were challenged as applied, the challenge might turn on the particular facts
and circumstances of the case, including how the Part 28 procedures were implemented.
To assess the Mathews factors inevitably involves a fair amount
of subjectivity. Where there are few if any cases on point, the task is
even harder. Here there is one case which some might find comparable. That is Chemical Waste Management decided by the D.C.
354 While the analytical force of this suggestion or argument cannot be gainsaid, it
is a fact of administrative law that precisely the more neutral the decisionmaker, the
more formal the procedures. Thus, informal proceedings are invariably before
agency employees not enjoying the protections of ALJs; formal adjudications are
before neutral ALJs, even if formalistically they are employees of the agency; and the
most formal proceedings, civil judicial trials, are before Article III judges.
355 See 56 Fed. Reg. 29,998 (1991).
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Circuit in 1989.56 There, EPA had adopted a set of informal adjudicatory procedures to govern the issuance of certain corrective action orders to certain facilities which treat, store, or dispose of
hazardous wastes. 35 7' Those procedures were like those under Part
28 in that they utilized the same Presiding Officer to preside at
hearings, but they were unlike the Part 28 procedures in that they
did not allow for the direct or cross-examination of witnesses by
parties. Rather, the hearing was more like a legislative-type hearing, with the parties allowed to make presentations to the Presiding
Officer and the Presiding Officer allowed to ask the parties questions. These procedures were challenged on their face as violative
of due process.3 5 8
The court applied the Mathews test and upheld the informal
procedure. As to the private interest, the court found that the financial stakes for potential defendants could vary widely, but there
was no evidence that EPA was incorrect in expecting the great majority of cases to involve only small sums of money. Here, where
the challenge was to the regulations on their face, the court indicated that judgments on the basis of a worst case were inappropriate. The court held open the possibility, however, that in an actual
case where the impacts were particularly great, those impacts could
3 59
be factored into the Mathews calculus.
The two primary claims as to the risk of error were that the
failure to allow trial-like procedures and the use of an agency attorney instead of an ALJ increased the risk of error. The court rejected the first claim on the basis that the plaintiffs had failed to
explain how trial-like procedures "will significantly advance the accuracy of an adjudicative process in which the issues typically do
not require determinations of witness credibility but turn instead
upon technical data and policy judgments."" 6 The court noted
that the same point had been made in Mathews.361 As to the request for the ALJ,the court pointed out that in Withrow v. Larkine6 2
the Supreme Court had established a stringent standard for an "as
873 F.2d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
See 40 C.F.R. Part 24 (1991).
The procedures were also challenged on the grounds that the statute implicitly
required formal adjudication under the APA. The D.C. Circuit, applying the Chevron
analysis, rejected this argument. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
359 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1484 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
360 Id.
361 Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-44 (1976)).
362 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
356
357
358
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applied" attack on procedures that allow the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions. When the attack is a facial one,
the court concluded that it is impossible to find the actual bias or
prejudgment which the Court found necessary for a constitutional
violation.
As to the government's interest, the court accepted EPA's estimate that the informal procedure would save half the cost of a formal, APA hearing, and that the cost of formal procedures would
significantly impair EPA's ability to enforce the statute. Interestingly, the court did not address EPA's further, and perhaps more
compelling, argument that most corrective action orders would involve regulatory violations threatening the public health and safety,
so that informal procedures to speed up the process were justified
by the need for expedition. 63
Applying the Mathews cost/benefit analysis, the court found
that "to the modest extent that EPA's [informal procedures] do implicate the private interest in avoiding the expense of unnecessary
corrective actions, formal procedures do not promise a sufficient
lowering of the risk of error to justify their significant expense to
the Government."

3

11

While much of the D.C. Circuit's analysis seems transferable to
EPA's Part 28 procedures, which after all are substantially more
trial-like than those upheld in Chemical Waste Management, there
still may be some significant differences. First, unlike corrective
action orders, which do not necessarily indicate that the defendant
violated any law, orders assessing penalties necessarily stigmatize
the defendant as a law-violator.
Second, and more importantly, EPA itself distinguished Part
24 corrective action orders from "RCRA 3008(a) compliance orders." 6 5 "RCRA 3008(a) compliance orders" may include civil
penalties of up to $25,000 per day.366 These orders, EPA said, were
more likely to involve factual issues such as "questions whether certain events or violations occurred, the timing of certain events/vio363 See 53 Fed. Reg. 12,256-57 (1988). The court in its Cheron analysis rejected
EPA's argument that the legislative history behind the corrective action provisions
indicated a legislative intent that the proceedings be expedited. See Chemical Waste
Management, Inc., 873 F.2d at 1483. However, whether or not Congress specifically
intended informal procedures so as to quicken the response time to releases of hazardous waste, if informal procedures do in fact expedite such responses, it would
seem that for the Mathews analysis an important government interest in the informal
procedures would be the need to expedite responses to releases of hazardous waste.
364 Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 873 F.2d at 1485.
365 53 Fed. Reg. 12,256-57 (1988).
366 See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (1), (3) (1988).
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lations, the seriousness of the violation, [and] the economic benefit
to the respondent of the violation." 6 7 These characteristics would
seem equally applicable to penalty proceedings under the various
statutory provisions to be enforced under Part 28. In addition,
whereas the court in Chemical Waste Management might note the imperfect fit between direct and cross-examination of witnesses and
the "technical data and policy judgments" involved in corrective
action order proceedings,3 6 8 here the additional procedures commenters seek are more responsive to the nature of the issues.
Thus, the desire to file exceptions to the recommended decision,
the objection to the procedure for the penalty phase of the proceeding, and the short page limits for legal and policy arguments,
for example, all arguably would be means of increasing accuracy
more directly tailored to the nature of disputes likely to arise.3 69
Moreover, Chemical Waste Management's analysis of the lack of strict
neutrality of the Presiding Officer, while accurate as a response to a
due process challenge based solely upon the hearing officer's alleged bias or prejudgment, simply is not responsive to the inclusion of the lack of strict neutrality into the Mathews analysis.
As to the Government's interest, it is clear that with respect to
penalty assessments there can be no claim that health and safety
considerations suggest expedition. There is, nevertheless, a clear
similarity between EPA's claims in promulgating Part 24 under
RCRA and Part 28, when it stated that requiring formal, APA proceedings would "enormously increase the costs and personnel time
incurred for such hearings and cause significant delays. It would
decrease the important deterrent value of these enforcement efforts and potentially cripple enforcement efforts Agency-wide by
overwhelming the Agency's Administrative LawJudges." 70 As indicated earlier, however, this claim is easy to make; it is more difficult
53 Fed. Reg. 12,256-57 (1988).
Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 873 F.2d at 1484.
As indicated earlier, see supra note 97, the traditional notion that the purpose of a
hearing was to address contested facts, not questions of law, was premised on the
notion that courts decided questions of law de novo, whereas they deferred to agency
determinations of fact. Hence, unless the court was to provide a trial de novo, the
process for determining facts before the agency had to mimic a court's process. After
the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron, U.SA. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), however, it appears that agencies can decide questions of law in a manner that effectively
binds courts. If this is so, the post-Chevron concept of what process is due in an agency
proceeding might include procedures whose purpose is to mimic court procedures
for determining questions of law.
570 56 Fed. Reg. 29,998 (1991).
367
368
369
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to substantiate, especially given the infrequency with which hearings on the merits actually take place.
Chemical Waste Management cannot, accordingly, be deemed
dispositive of the due process adequacy of Part 28. Nonetheless, its
thrust is clear, and it is consistent with the general lack of serious
due process challenges to the Coast Guard's informal penalty procedures. Indeed, one must conclude that if a court were to strike
down Part 28's procedures as inadequate under the due process
clause, it would likely be headline news in the administrative law
world. This should not, however, make EPA sanguine about its
prospects if the regulations were seriously challenged. Part 28 is
sufficiently different from procedures challenged before, particularly in the very notion that "penalties" are involved and the fact
that the decision rendered
is final, not interim, to make any prog3 71
difficult.
nostication
B.

Policy Issues

Assuming that due process is satisfied by the informal procedures provided in EPA's and the Corps' regulations, there remain
policy questions raised by some aspects of those regulations.
Again, the lack of assured neutrality of the Presiding Officer must
be addressed. Whether or not ALJs are used, there are ways that
EPA could better insulate the Presiding Officers from both the reality and appearance of enforcement oversight and influence.
Some of these ways, such as making the job fulltime and not having
the Presiding Officer rated by persons in the enforcement office,
would be inexpensive, but effective, methods. The fact that most
EPA regions and the Coast Guard have ensured greater neutrality
demonstrates its feasibility.
Given the nature of the issues likely to be involved in EPA penalty proceedings, as well as the truncated papers allowed to be filed
initially, there would seem to be positive value in allowing parties
to file exceptions to the Presiding Officer's recommended decision. Concededly, this would add a significant amount of time to
the proceeding, but the infrequency with which these proceedings
371 The author was invited to write the problem for the 1992 National Administrative Law Moot Court Competition and to judge in the final round of competition.
One of the issues in the problem was a due process challenge to EPA's procedures
under proposed Part 28 for imposing administrative penalties. After the competition
was concluded and the prizes awarded, the author asked the other two final round
judges, a federal district court judge and a federal magistrate, what their reaction was
on the merits. Both expressed the view that the procedures were unconstitutional.
Although moot court is not real court, the judges' initial reaction cannot be ignored.
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will ever reach the recommended decision stage and the lack of
need for speed in individual cases-as opposed to generally having
these cases handled expeditiously-suggest this added time would
not be a great burden. EPA appears to be seriously considering
this issue, because it specifically asked for comments concerning
it.3 72 Again, the fact that the Coast Guard with its vastly greater
number of cases can allow for the equivalent-an administrative
appeal-suggests that allowing such comments would not meaningfully burden EPA.
A larger issue, and one beyond the control of EPA or the
Corps of Engineers, is the requirement for providing an opportunity for public comment that is attached to the penalty provisions
under Section 3 0 9 (g) of the Clean Water Act and Section 300h of
the Safe Drinking Water Act, as well as the Class II penalty provisions of the Oil Pollution Act.37 3 There seems little question that
this requirement complicates and extends the time necessary for
completing even simple consent orders.3 7 4 At the same time, there
is virtually no evidence that the public participation requirements
have resulted in any public participation. For the reasons indicated earlier,3 75 this is not surprising, given EPA's method of notification. Nevertheless, even a more effective notification system
seems highly unlikely to result in meaningful public participation
in all but the most unusual case.3 76 This suggests that the idea behind the public participation requirement was initially flawed, and
probably the provisions should be repealed.
The largest policy issue, again beyond the agencies' control, is
the decision to create a non-APA adjudication for administrative
penalties. It cannot be gainsaid that this decision in certain statutes has been the result of conscious congressional action, but that
372 See 56 Fed. Reg. 29,998 (1991). Subsequent to the publication of the proposed
rule, EPA created a new administrative appellate body, the Environmental Appeals
Board, which has been delegated the Administrator's authority with respect to the
final agency decision on appeal from a number of agency adjudications, including all
administrative penalties assessed by formal adjudication. See 40 C.F.R. § 1.25(e), 57
Fed. Reg. 5320 (1992). EPA should consider whether to allow appeals to this new
body from its administrative penalty proceedings under proposed Part 28.
373 See supra note 176.
374 For example, a consent order cannot be signed before the period for public
comments is over. See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,028 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 28.22(b)(1)(i)) (proposed July 1, 1991).
375 See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
376 See letter from Kirk Cunningham, Water Quality Chair, Sierra Club, Boulder,
Colorado, to the author (February 3, 1992) (on file with author) (indicating the limited resources and time available and the need to focus only on big issues, not on
details; "The administrative penalties business sounds like a detail to me.").
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action has been inconsistent. First, there is inconsistency in the
maximum penalty amount that can be assessed in an informal proceeding.3 77 Second, there is inconsistency between what requires a
formal adjudication and what does not.3 7 1 Moreover, other than
penalty amount, there is usually no distinguishing feature between
when or under what circumstances the agency is to use informal as
opposed to formal adjudication.3 79 The inconsistency or irrationality between statutes is compounded by agency practice. Thus, EPA
has formal procedures for certain orders and penalties,38 0 informal
procedures for certain orders, 8 ' and informal procedures for certain penalties." 2 In addition, the procedures applicable to violations of the same law and penalized under the same statutory
provision may be governed by different procedures, depending
83
upon which agency is doing the enforcement.
Why Congress has chosen to create a category of non-APA
penalty procedures is not entirely clear. The agencies have requested it, they say, to avoid the cost and effort they believe is in377 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (3) (Supp. III 1990) (up to $5000 per day for violations of Clean Air Act) with 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(c) (1988) (up to $10,000 per day, not
to exceed $125,000, for certain violations of underground injection control regulations under the Safe Drinking Water Act) and 33 U.S.C. § 13 19(g) (2) (A) (1988) (up
to $10,000 per violation, not to exceed $25,000 for violations of the Clean Water Act).
378 For example, the administrative penalty provisions added to the Safe Drinking
Water Act in 1986 authorized EPA to assess penalties by non-APA procedures of up to
$10,000 per day (not to exceed $125,000) for certain violations of the underground
injection control regulations and of up to $5,000 per day (not to exceed $125,000) for
certain other violations of the underground injection control program. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 300h-2(c) (1988). In the same amendment, however, Congress authorized EPA to
assess only by formal, APA procedures penalties up to $5,000 for violations of compliance orders under the Safe Drinking Water Act's public water system regulations. See
42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(g) (1988). Penalties for greater than $5,000 are required to be
assessed by courts. Id.
3
379 See 33 U.S.C. § 1 19(g)(1)-(3) (1988); 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(A)-(B), (8)
(Supp. III 1990); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1)-(3) (Supp. III 1990); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9609(a)(1)(A)-(E), (b)(1)-(5) (1988).
380 See 40 C.F.R. Part 22 (1992) (general procedures for most APA adjudications);
40 C.F.R. Part 27 (1992) (procedures for assessing penalties in program fraud).
381 See 40 C.F.R. Part 24 (1992) (procedures for issuing corrective action orders
under RCRA); 40 C.F.R. Part 142, Subpart J (1992) (procedures for issuing compliance orders under the public waters systems provisions of the Clean Water Act).
382 See Proposed 40 C.F.R. Part 28.
383 For example, both EPA and the Coast Guard are authorized to assess administrative penalties for violations of Section 311 of the Clean Water Act, see 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321 (b) (6) (Supp. III 1990), but they have different procedures for informal penalty assessments. If the Coast Guard enforces the Hazardous Materials Transportation
Act, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1809 (Supp. III 1990), it uses its informal procedures under 33
C.F.R. § 1.07 (1991), but if the Federal Aviation Administration enforces the same
statutory provision, it uses formal, APA procedures, see 14 C.F.R § 13.201 (a) (2)
(1991).
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volved in formal adjudications. Congress has apparently accepted
that representation. In the context of EPA's administrative penalty
program, however, it is not clear that much cost and effort are in
fact saved by instituting informal procedures. At one level this is
due simply to the fact that most cases are settled before any meaningful hearing procedures have been utilized. There is no harm in
a high settlement rate, but it might suggest that those few who do
not settle may have a legitimate defense, one worthy of the requisite formalities to protect its effective articulation and proof.
The assumption underlying the creation of these new informal
penalty provisions must be that APA adjudication, which was created as a more expeditious, less formal proceeding than its alternative-a judicial proceeding-is itself so cumbersome and immune
to expedition that a new type of proceeding is required. Undoubtedly many hold this view, and neither it nor the reaction that results from it are limited to administrative penalty proceedings. 84
Nevertheless, this view and assumption need examination and
confirmation.
The perception that formal, APA adjudication is complex,
costly, and slow is widespread. It extends from Congress to the
Casebooks. 85 Yet, if this perception is true, it is not necessarily due
to the procedural requirements of the APA. Sections 554, 556, and
557 do not mandate long, drawn-out proceedings. Indeed, they
allow for limiting depositions, 8 6 excluding irrelevant, immaterial,
and unduly repetitious evidence,3 8 7 for precluding cross-examination that is not required for a full and true disclosure of the
384 A recent survey of non-APA hearing proceedings identified 129 types of cases
for which hearings are provided but which are not APA hearings. Frye, supra note
279, at 264.
385 In GELLHoRN ET AL., supra note 70, at 892, there is a picture of an ALJ literally
surrounded by the record of one case. The caption, quoting from Fortune magazine
reads in part:
This paper mountain is only part of the testimony and documents
pertaining to a single FPC gas case. The hearings to determine which
new pipe line should be certified to serve midwestern markets ran for
143 days. Every one had his say in extenso and no doubt FPC hearing
examiners like Edward B. Marsh, above, read each of the thousands of
transcript pages.
However dated this particular example, its presence as the only picture in the most
popular administrative law casebook reflects and reinforces the popular conception
of formal adjudication. See alsojerry L. Mashaw, OrganizingAdjudication: Reflections on
the Prospectfor Artisans in the Age of Robots, Administrative Law News (American Bar
Association Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy) Spring 1992, at 1.
386 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (4) (1988).
387 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1988).
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facts,'"and for deciding a case or issues therein by summary judgment.389 There are no particular restrictions on an agency's ability
to set deadlines for filing documents or holding hearings or to set
page limits governing documents filed. Indeed, other than EPA's
denial of the ability to file exceptions to a recommended decision,
virtually all of EPA's procedural shortcuts in its proposed Part 28
could be adopted with respect to formal, APA adjudications. Nevertheless, the history of agencies attempting to expedite APA adjudications is not one to instill confidence in an agency proposing
such an undertaking.3 90
This history is fraught with conflicts between agencies and
ALJs over ALJ independence. 39 1 Rather than attempt by rule to

structure an expedited proceeding, however, agencies have traditionally attempted to identify those ALJs who resolved significantly
less cases than their peers and to take some remedial action against
them. 92 These reviews almost of necessity involve evaluation of
how the ALJ is doing his job and consequently are viewed by ALJs
as interfering with their independence.
This history, however, does not indicate that ALJs are unresponsive to rules adopted by agencies governing adjudicatory procedures. Thus, were EPA, for example, to impose most of the
requirements in its proposed Part 28 to formal, APA adjudications,
many might question their wisdom or efficacy, but those requirements would not raise the issue of ALJ independence as evaluation
programs have in the past. Even those requirements specifically
aimed at controlling Presiding Officer discretion, such as the prohibition on granting any delay based on a party's request for information beyond that mandated in the rule, with disqualification of
the Presiding Officer as a penalty for violation,393 relate to open
enforcement of clear rules of procedure by parties to the adjudica388 Id.

389 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1988).
390 Often the focus is not expedition generally but increased productivity of the
ALJs. Invariably, attempts to evaluate or enforce productivity become caught up in

charges of interference with the independence of ALJs. See, e.g., Moss, supranote 348,
at 56-58. See also Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989); Nash v. Califano, 613
F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980). For a general review of attempts to evaluate ALJ performance,
see The Federal AdministrativeJudiciary,The Administrative Conference of the United
States (draft report, May 1992) at 152-162.
391

Id.

392

See, e.g.,

COMPTRO1.R GENERAL OF THE UNrrED STATES, REPORT TO CONGRESS,

ADMiNiSTRATrvE LAW PROcEss: BETTER MANAGEMENT iS NEEmED
393 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,024-25 (1991) (to be codified at 40

28.13) (proposedJuly 1, 1991).

(May 15, 1978).
C.F.R. §§ 28.4(c) (4),
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tion. Thus, it is not clear that expedited procedures could not be
mandated by rule even in formal, APA adjudications.
The difficulty lies in the fact that inevitably even the expedited
procedure rules must allow discretion to the Presiding Officer.
Thus, for example, EPA's proposed procedures can afford extremely short page limits for written legal arguments, because
there is the loophole that the Presiding Officer can grant exceptions for good cause. 9 4 If the agency trusts the judgment of the
Presiding Officer, it is more willing to provide for that discretion.
Agencies, however, do not appear to "trust" ALJs to exercise that
discretion in the manner desired by the agency, at least compared
to other agency employees. That is, agencies expect the ALJs to
exercise that discretion not according to the spirit intended in the
regulation, as a necessary loophole to provide for the unexpected
contingency, but according to their own lights as to the needs of
justice. Other agency personnel, however, are viewed as more
likely to reflect the institutional desires for expedited proceedings.
Whether this perception is accurate is difficult to assess, but inasmuch as ALJs are not supposed to be "part of the team" for substantive purposes in the adjudication, it would not be surprising if
they did not see as their mission furthering the agency's case management goals, as opposed to doing justice in some abstract sense.
Thus, the agency is more likely to "trust" an employee other than
an ALJ to internalize the agency's case management philosophy.
Moreover, if this "trust" is not borne out, the agency is free to utilize a different employee as Presiding Officer, an option not available if an ALJ is required to be the hearing officer. Accordingly,
the dynamics of ALJ independence conspire against an agency
even by rule substantially expediting formal, APA adjudications.
CONCLUSION

When the procedures for formal adjudication were adopted in
the APA, they were to be broadly applicable to the range of adjudications which were required to be made on the record after an
opportunity for an agency hearing. The contemporaneous Attorney General's Manual makes clear that the applicability of Section
554 was not to be narrowly interpreted. 9 5 Moreover, its purpose
was to provide uniform procedures for this class of hearings that
94 See 56 Fed. Reg. 30,024 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 28.8) (proposed

July 12, 1991).
395 See Att'y General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 91 (1947).
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were to be on the record. 9 6
This broad applicability and uniformity of procedure has been
seriously eroded, not just in the area of administrative penalties,
but with respect to administrative adjudications generally.3 9 7 Onthe-record hearings not subject to Section 554 have proliferated in
the law. The Frye Reporii'documents its extent.
Agencies clearly prefer non-APA adjudication. They lobby for
it with Congress, and they interpret ambiguous statutory provisions
to allow for it. Their motives are equally clear. One motive is
overt-the wish to avoid the perceived complexity, cost, and delay
associated with formal, APA adjudications. The other motive is
more covert-the desire to exercise more control both procedurally and substantively over the adjudication process-especially by
avoiding the need to use independent ALJs.
With respect to administrative penalties, the claim has been
made that requiring formal adjudication would seriously harm enforcement efforts, because of the time and cost required by such
adjudications. This claim, made to Congress, was not supported by
any documentation contained in the legislative history. The evidence that only a relatively small number of cases actually require
any hearing casts doubt on the accuracy of this claim. Moreover, as
three Presiding Officers have written, "[i] n terms of procedural formality, these proceedings are the functional equivalent of hearings
under the APA." 39 This suggests that EPA's informal procedures
will not save any time or money compared to APA procedures.
This is especially likely considering that EPA has not made any attempt to utilize expedited procedures under the APA.
As to the more covert motive, it is understandable why it is
covert. An agency cannot come out and say that it prefers non-APA
adjudications because it is easier for the agency to win if the proceeding is not governed by an independent ALJ. Nevertheless, this
belief undoubtedly motivates part of the desire for non-APA adjudications. But this invidious concept of control is not the only aspect of control. Agencies may appropriately desire to control the
procedure of adjudications, to ensure expeditious case manage396 Id. at 9.
397 See generally Frye, supra note 279.

398 Id.
399 Letter to Nancy Miller, Administrative Conference of the United States, from
Benjamin Kalkstein, Region III Presiding Officer, February 25, 1993, at 4; letter to
Nancy Miller, Administrative Conference of the United States, from Steven Anderson,
Region 9 Presiding Officer, and Al Smith, Region 8 Presiding Officer, March 4, 1993,
at 1.
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ment, so long as they do so by rules applicable to classes of cases,
rather than by influencing hearing officers in particular cases. Attempts to expedite case handling by ALJs have not been notably
successful under the APA, precisely because of the independence
of ALJs, but agencies have not used procedural rules to limit the
discretion of ALJs or to establish particular deadlines. Rather,
agencies have tended to resort to oversight of particular judges,
thereby raising questions as to interference with their independence. Until agencies have tried and failed to achieve expedition
by using procedural rules governing APA proceedings, agency
pleas for relief should be subject to doubt.
While this Article has been skeptical of the need to except administrative penalty proceedings from the APA in order to achieve
expeditious and efficient case handling, Congress has nevertheless
accepted the argument, at least for "lesser" penalties. Congress too
is interested in effective enforcement of its laws, and it has found
that criminal and civil enforcement in the courts is time-consuming and expensive. Accordingly, Congress has increasingly provided for administrative orders and administrative penalties as
alternatives to civil injunctions or penalties.' Within the universe
of administrative penalties, there is a certain intuitive sense that if
large penalty amounts can be assessed using formal, APA procedures, smaller penalty amounts should be able to be assessed using
less formal procedures. Indeed, even defendants may prefer informal proceedings if they are cheaper but provide an adequate opportunity to defend oneself given the possible penalty to be
inflicted. It is this distinction between greater and lesser penalties
associated with more elaborate and less elaborate procedures that
seems to characterize Congress's response to agency requests for
informal penalty assessment procedures. That is, the "need" for
non-APA procedures relates solely to the relatively smaller amount
of the penalty to be imposed.4 '
If informal adjudications for orders and penalties are to become widespread, Congress would do well to consider an amendment to the APA. At present, each agency is required to re-invent
400 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988) (authorizing President to seek court injunction or to issue an order to protect the public health and welfare and the environment); 42 U.S.C. § 9609(a)-(c) (1988) (providing for informal and formal
administrative penalties and civil penalties assessed by court; the amount and standards for penalties identical between formal adjudication and judicial imposition).
401 Unfortunately, Congress is not consistent with respect to what lesser penalties
are, see supra note 377, and Congress's idea that "lesser" or "minor" penalties can
reach six figures may not accord with common understandings.
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the wheel with only the vague contours of due process and Mathews
v. Eldridge as a guide. Despite the lack of serious judicial challenge
to the Coast Guard's informal administrative penalty procedures in
the past, expansion to other agencies and programs of non-APA
penalty assessment power is likely to spawn new challenges. 4°2 This
all involves substantial transaction costs to widespread use of informal adjudications for on-the-record hearings. An amendment to
the APA to provide in addition for a less formal or non-ALJ adjudication could further the original goals of the APA's adjudication
provisions: to provide uniformity in the law and to enact "a formula
upon which opposing social and political forces have come to
rest,"403 thereby earning the respectful consideration of the courts.
402 Cf Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509 (lst Cir. 1991) (en banc) (holding
EPA's lien procedure under Superfund a violation of procedural due process).
403 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950).

